US- YEMEN RELATIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD: A STUDY OF FOUR MAJOR EVENTS IN US-YEMEN RELATIONS

BY

BAKEEL A. AL-ZANDANI

A MASTER'S THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY OF RICHARD L. CONOLY COLLEGE, LONG ISLAND UNIVERSITY,

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

APRIL 17, 2003

Abstract

This study examines US-Yemen relations by focusing on four crucial turning points: Yemeni unity (declared May 22, 1990); the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990; the Yemeni Civil War of 1994; and the attacks of September 11 on the US. The study argues that US-Yemen relations were transformed in the latter half of the 1990s up to 2003 for several reasons, among them strained American-Saudi and Saudi-Yemen relations, and the rise of terrorism as the main threat to US interests and security.

The study argues that the events of September 11 in the United States were accompanied by economic deterioration in Yemen, which along with the rise of social and political problems, led to the convergence of interests between the Bush Administration and the government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Saleh’s objectives included the military, economic and political strengthening of his regime, particularly in terms of the expansion of his power to the remote regions of Yemen.

Acknowledgment

I wish to thank the members of my thesis committee for contributing the time to review my work and providing me with their invaluable support. In particular, I would like to thank Professor Jayne S. Werner for the support she rendered me firstly as a student in her classes and secondly as a thesis writer under her supervision. Many thanks also go to the chairman of the department of political science, Professor John Ehrenberg and to Professor Robert Fitch and all the other professors with whom I studied while at Long Island University. Special thanks go to my friend and colleague Abdullah Al-faqih.

I would also like to thank the state of Qatar and the Qatari Embassy in Washington D.C. for their continuous support. Without the scholarship I received from the Qatari government, and without the help from the embassy, this achievement would not have been possible. Sana'a University also deserves my gratitude for allowing me to pursue my graduate studies while on a leave of absence.

Finally, I would like to thank my father and mother for nurturing me and for their continuous prayers.


Table of Contents

I. Introduction

The political upheaval that swept away communist and authoritarian regimes in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which culminated in the collapse of the former USSR and the emergence of the US as the only superpower in the world, has led to profound changes in the patterns of interaction within and among countries. US-Yemen relations are one of the instances in which the bilateral relations between the US and a previously marginal country to US have been transformed due to changes in the international system, triggering changes in the interests and policies of the two countries.

Previous Studies of US-Yemen Relations

As a small country (at least in terms of power and resources), Yemen did not come under the radar of US policy analysts until recently. Even during the Cold War, the US delegated the question of Yemen to the Saudi regime giving it the upper hand in deciding what was best for Yemen and the US. Overall, US relations with Yemen were filtered through the Saudi regime. As a result, very few Western analysts were attracted to US-Yemeni relations as a subject for study. The tradition of ignoring US-Yemen relations continued through the 1990s, although some newly found interest in the subject started to emerge. The few works available cover US-Yemen relations during the Yemeni civil war (1962-1970); US-Yemeni relations during the period of two independent states (Yemen Arab Republic-YAR, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen-PDRY); and more recent works which analyze US-Yemen relations after Yemeni unification in 1990.

The Subject of this Study

This study looks at the pattern of interaction between the US and Yemen in the post-Cold War era focusing on four turning points in the relations between the two countries. These points are: 1-the unification of Yemen in May 1990 2- the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 3- The Yemeni civil war of 1994 and 4-the war on terrorism and its impact on the two countries.

Following the realist school in international relations as laid out by Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz and others, this study will show that in their foreign policies, the US and Yemen have been concerned first and foremost with their security and economic interests. Other issues such as human rights and promotion of democracy are often ignored especially when there is a contradiction between security and economic interests on one side and foreign policy ethics and principles on the other. According to Hudson, five concerns dominated the US approach toward Yemen during the 1990s; 1- the normalization of Saudi-Yemeni relations and the resolution of their border conflict as an
imperative for stability in the Arabian Peninsula; 2- the normalization of relations between Yemen and Israel and an active Yemeni role in the Middle East peace process;
3- the American concern regarding terrorism; 4- Yemen’s economic reform program; and
5- Yemeni domestic reconciliation and solving the problems resulting from the 1994 civil war(Hudson, 1997: 171-174). While Hudson’s stipulations are still valid, recent political
developments (especially the attacks on the USS Cole, the World Trade Center and the Pentagon) have altered the priorities of the US government, placing the fight against terrorism as the top priority of the US government.

This study also shows that Yemeni-Saudi relations and US-Saudi relations have been the major shaping force of US-Yemen relations. The impact of the Saudi variable on US-Yemen bilateral relations can be traced back to the 1960s when President Kennedy, despite Saudi and British objections, decided to recognize the revolutionary government in Sana’a (Yemen’s capital city). The historical pattern has been as follows: when US-Saudi relations became tense, the Americans moved closer to Yemen. For their part, Yemeni officials have followed a similar strategy. At times of crisis in Saudi-Yemeni relations, Yemen tends to place greater emphasis on its relations with Washington, D.C.

Finally, the study shows that the events of September 11th have reshaped the US agenda not only in terms of its relations with Yemen, but also in its relations with other Arab/Muslim countries. The central argument is that there has been a convergence of interests for the US and Yemeni Governments, particularly in terms of the war on terrorism. This study speculates that the future will bring even greater cooperation between the US and Yemen.

Theoretical Aspects

Two major schools compete to explain states’ behavior in the international arena: the realist school and the idealist school (also known as the liberal school). While both schools are deeply rooted in the historical evolution of political thought, idealism emerged during the interlude between the first and second World Wars. In the aftermath of World War II, idealists like American President Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921) thought that world peace could be sustained by cooperation among nations. The first result of this thinking was the creation of the League of Nations (1920-1946). The idealists argue that:

1) Although the international system is characterized by anarchy (defined as the lack of order), regional and international organizations do matter in ameliorating the anarchic nature of the system because they create some sort of order.

2) Harmony of interests in peace: States can benefit from the prevalence of peace regardless of their size and capabilities. Peace and not war is the natural tendency of human beings.

3) States are equal in terms of legal sovereignty and the inviolability of state sovereignty except in incidences of gross human rights violations such as genocide.

4) Power can be curbed by the establishment of regional and international organizations and the development of international legal rights including human rights.

However, the failure of the idealists to predict (and consequently to prevent) the occurrence of a second devastating world war significantly undermined the idealist school and contributed to the rise of the realist school as a dominant paradigm in the post-war era. Unlike idealists, the realists emphasize:

1) States are the key actors in the global system. Other actors such as international organizations are recognized only as they relate to states.

2) International politics is a struggle for power because the system is anarchic. There is no legal authority to protect states from aggression. States have to take matters into their own hands and amass power to ensure their survival. Relying on international public opinion, regional and international organizations, and international law to protect states is no more than wishful thinking.

3) Gradation of capabilities: states are equal in terms of legal sovereignty but not in terms of capabilities and that is one of the causes of war. The weak and vulnerable invite the strong and capable to invade.

4) States are unitary actors: this aspect emphasizes that countries speak with one voice when it comes to foreign policy as opposed to domestic politics where different interests and voices compete with each other.

5) States are rational actors, which engage in calculations of costs and benefits before embarking on major decisions. Their constant goal is to maximize power.

6) Power is the key concept: Hans Morgenthau (the father of realism) argues that nations seek either to keep power, to increase
power, or to demonstrate power (Morgenthau, 1978).

This study uses the realist lenses to analyze US-Yemeni relations. Despite the shortcomings of the realist school and its overemphasis on power and national interests, it continues to offer more relevant insights into international relations and foreign policy-making. Meanwhile, the study recognizes the contribution of the idealist school whenever applicable.

This study is divided into six chapters. This chapter reviews the current literature on US-Yemen relations. It also briefly examines the realist and idealist perspectives in international relations and the usefulness in describing and analyzing the behavior of countries as they interact with each other. It argues that the realist framework has more explanatory power than the competing theories (i.e., the idealist perspective).

The second chapter traces US-Yemen relations as they evolved historically with special attention to President Kennedy’s recognition of the YAR as well as the US role in the civil war of 1962-1970. It also looks into the Saudi role in filtering the relations between the US and Yemen. It is divided into four parts. Part one examines pre-revolution relations. Part two discusses the Kennedy Administration’s recognition of the September-1962 revolution in North Yemen; and part three traces US relations with both Yemens during the 1970s and 1980s up to the unification of Yemen in 1990.

Chapter three examines the causes, processes, and US role in the unification of Yemen, which took place on May 22^nd, 1990. It is divided into two parts. In the first part, the causes and process of the Yemen unification is discussed. The second part analyzes the US stance on Yemeni unification and the rationality and calculation behind this stance. The argument advanced here is that the US government viewed the Yemeni unification as an important development in the dismantling of the communist regime in South Yemen, which was classified by the US government as a terrorist state until 1990. In addition, it argues that the US perceived Yemeni unity as an imperative for stability in the region, and subsequently as a facilitating factor in achieving and protecting the US interests in the region.

Chapter four is devoted to the Yemeni stance on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the presence of foreign forces, and the impact of the Yemeni position on US-Yemen relations. Its major argument is that despite the Yemeni stance on the invasion of Iraq and the presence of foreign troops in the region, the US government showed more tolerance of Sana'a’s position and decided instead to put pressure on the Yemeni government to adjust its official position.

Chapter five is concerned with the Yemeni civil war in 1994 and the US government’s support of the president Saleh against the leaderships of the YSP (South), despite the Saudi and Kuwaiti displeasure with Yemen and their covert support for the Southern leadership in its bid for secession.

Chapter six looks into the evolution of US-Yemen relations since the end of the 1994 Yemeni civil war. It argues that relations have improved in response to the challenges and opportunities presented to them. The US looked at Yemen as a potential ally in times when it faced growing resentment in the Gulf countries. Likewise, the Yemenis saw the US as an important ally that could balance the Saudi pressure on them to settle the border dispute on Saudi terms. They also saw in the US a capable partner that could support economic and political reform in the country. After the attack on the USS Cole in the port city of Aden, Yemen became more important in US foreign policy. After September 11 2001, Yemen was singled out as one of the most likely places for terrorism, prompting the US and the Yemen government to work together more closely.

II. Historical Background

Introduction

This chapter discusses the evolution of US-Yemeni relations up to 1990. It is divided into three sections. The first section deals with pre-1962 interactions. Section two focuses on the Kennedy Administration’s decision to recognize the regime created after the September 1962 revolution.¹ Section three examines US-Yemen relations during the decades of the 1970s and 1980s.

Section A. The Genesis of US-Yemeni Relations

Throughout the twentieth century, Yemen was divided into two parts, North and South. North Yemen, immediately after the withdrawal of the Turkish forces in 1918, fell under the rule of the Hamid al-Din family. The first and the longest ruling member of this family was Imam² Yahya (1918-1948) whose reign ended with his assassination at the hands of coup plotters. His son Ahmed succeeded him until 1962. In his turn, Ahmed died as a result of wounds inflicted on him by an assassination attempt carried out by his political opponents. On September 19, 1962, Imam Mohammad al-Badr, the deceased Imam’s son, rose to power. The Imams ruled Yemen with an iron fist and followed an isolationist policy that kept Yemen closed to the modern world. Although Yemen did become a member of the Arab League (in 1945) and the United Nations (in 1947), Yemenis were not allowed to interact with the outside world. The reign of terror ended with the events of September 26, 1962 (only one week after the new Imam rose to the throne) when a group of military officers took over power and overthrew the monarchy.

US relations with the Mutawakilite Kingdom of Yemen (MKOY) can be traced back to the mid 1940s. In the aftermath of World War II, an American delegation arrived in Sana’a on February 6, 1946—only a few months after the end of WW II. The delegation, headed by Colonel William Eddy, carried with it the American recognition of the MOKY (Saed 1959: 130). On March 4, 1946 a bilateral meeting between representatives of the MKOY and the US convened in New York and reaffirmed the recognition of the former by the latter (Almadhagi 1996: 18). In the same year, the US opened legation in the city of Taiz (the capital of MKOY at that time).³ The US ambassador to Egypt supervised this legation. As a result of this recognition, Imam Yahya sent an envoy with a letter to President Truman in 1947 (Ibid). Imam Yahya expected economic aid from the American side but this visit did not bring forth any new agreements between the two countries. It is worth noting that, the MKOY’s joining of the UN was partially encouraged by President Truman’s administration.

In February, 1948, a revolutionary group assassinated Imam Yahya.⁴ As a result, his son Ahmed became the new Imam of MKOY. From that time on Imam Ahmed looked for good relations with the US and other countries especially those who opposed the British colonial policies in the region. The reason for this was Imam Ahmed’s desire to eliminate of the British occupation of South Yemen.⁵ Also, Imam Ahmed was looking for supporters who could supply his kingdom with armaments. The American recognition of Imam Ahmed’s regime came in 1952. In spite of this recognition, the relations between Yemen and the US did not improve because of British objections. Britain considered this region as a part of its empire.

During 1953- 54 the American government tried unsuccessfully to improve relations with Imam Ahmed by opening a permanent mission in Taiz city. There were some difficulties, however, because Imam Ahmed refused diplomatic missions the right to raise their national flags over their buildings in Yemen (Almadhagi 1996: 21). In 1955, Imam Ahmed faced an assassination attempt by a revolutionary group, who sought to oust the Imams rule. Once the revolutionary group failed, Imam Ahmed ordered the execution of the perpetrators. At this point, Ahmed realized that he needed to ally his kingdom with powerful countries that could help Yemen in its discord with the British and with its economic woes.

The rise of Cold War tensions between the Soviet Union and its satellite countries on one side, and the Western bloc, on the other, provided Imam Ahmed with a golden opportunity. With the US reluctant to go against the British presence in South Yemen, he turned to the USSR for support. He was encouraged by the fact that the Soviets had already supported some Arabic countries—such as Egypt and Syria-- diplomatically, economically and militarily. The outcome of Ahmed’s calculation was a treaty of friendship signed between the MKOY and the Soviet Union in November, 1955 (Wenner1967: 176). This agreement was beneficial to both sides: for the Imam of Yemen who wanted to balance the British in the South and for the leaders of the USSR who sought to find a foothold in the Arabian Peninsula. In addition, Imam Ahmed’s son Al Badr concluded a visit to some countries in the Eastern Bloc (including East Berlin, Czechoslovakia and Prague) with new economic agreements and friendly relations.

The USSR offered to supply Yemen with technical and economic support in different fields, especially agriculture. The Chinese, grateful to Imam Ahmed's recognition of the People’s Republic of China (founded in 1949), also offered similar support. However, Imam Ahmed, who wanted military and diplomatic support vis-à-vis the British, was not satisfied. Nor were the Americans who viewed the cooperation and the convergence of interests between the Soviets and the Imam as alarming (Wenner 1967: 177). The US Department of State was very concerned about Yemen-USSR closeness, especially when some Eastern bloc countries sent arms to Yemen. Furthermore, American officials thought that Yemen would be the only country in the Arab World with good relations with the Soviet Bloc.

To deal with the Yemeni question, the US ambassador to Saudi Arabia, asked the king of Saudi to talk to Imam Ahmed about the danger of Communist influence on Yemen⁶. Besides, the US sent a message to Imam Ahmed through the Yemeni ambassador to Egypt, and informed him those relations between the USSR and MKOY may escalate the tensions between the British and his country. American officials also assured the Imam that a peaceful solution to the rising tension in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula could be reached (Almadhagi, 1996: 22).

However, relations between the US and the MKOY did not improve because the Imam was looking for military and economic support, and the US was willing to cooperate only on economic issues and in accordance with the cooperation agreement, which they had signed with Imam Yahya. The US was seeking to continue excavating for petroleum as it used to do under Imam Yahya's rule.⁷ However, Imam expected that the US would do more than simply implement President Truman's so-called "Point Four” program.⁸

The US left the military affairs of the Southern Arabian Peninsula to the British to manage. It was a sensitive issue for Americans to even think of supplying the Imam of Yemen with military equipment or technical support. Such action would have provoked the British.

Several reasons contributed to America's interest the de-escalation of the conflict between the Imam of the MKOY and the British. First, Yemen had a great potential in terms of oil reserves and American companies were actively showing interest in these reserves. Second, American officials were fully aware of the geopolitics of Yemen and its proximity to oilfields in Saudi Arabia. For American companies, Saudi Arabia was the most important place in the Arabian Peninsula, to invest not only in the petroleum, but also in different fields, such as electricity, construction, and ways to supply the military with new weapons. “At the same time, the US had also invested in the construction and maintenance of military facilities in Saudi Arabia, especially in such installations as al- Zahran Air Base, which were intended to provide not only for the defense of the Middle East as a whole but also for the important oil reserves and installations of the whole region which were essential to the energy supply of Western Europe and Great Britain.” (Wenner, 1967: 180).

Third, Yemen, as demonstrated by Truman’s "Point Four" was part of the containment strategy. American officials felt that if the situation between the British and the Imam escalated, that could give the Soviets the opportunity to exploit the situation and find a footstep in North Yemen. Taken into consideration that Yemen overlooks the Red Sea through which the entire American trade with the Gulf States passes, the Americans were keen on resisting a Soviet presence or influence in the country. As Wenner (1967: 181) argues, “it should not be forgotten that Yemen’s strategic location was an important factor: nearly all American trade with the Gulf, as well as a large portion of the oil exports of this area, both to American allies in Europe and to North America itself, is carried in ships through the Suez Canal⁹ via the Red Sea.”

Fourth, the American and British governments had joint ventures in oil exploration in several countries in the region including Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain. “By the mid-nineteen-fifties this investment amounted to over a billion dollars in the infrastructure and facilities needed for the extraction, refining, and marketing of the petroleum”(Ibid, 1967: 180). For all these reasons, Americans sought to mediate between the two sides. They tried to start a conversation between the Imam and the British who directly or indirectly ruled South Yemen since they occupied Aden in 1939.¹⁰

The US policy toward Yemen did not change till 1957 when American officials learned of the arrival of Soviet military equipment in Yemen. Also, in 1957, the Soviet Union established its military mission in Sana’a--the major city in North Yemen. These developments confirmed American fears of a Soviet penetration of North Yemen (Almadhagi, 1996). Again, Washington tried to discuss the situation of Yemen with the British Embassy in the US in an attempt to resolve the border dispute between the two sides (Ibid.).

The Soviet presence in Yemen meant a breakthrough for the Soviets. In fact it was the first country in the Peninsula to open its doors for them. At the same time the Soviet’s foothold in Yemen created a great opportunity for the Soviet Block to fulfill foreign- policy intentions in the Middle East and East Africa. (Wenner, 1967: 181). It also meant an increasing threat against American and Western interests especially those related to trade and military routes. Also, the Soviet’s influence in the region threatened some counties in the Peninsula, such as Saudi Arabia. “Certainly the establishment of a pro-Soviet state on the peninsula could have serious repercussions for other states, especially Saudi Arabia; it would most certainly provide a base for political propaganda and perhaps also for outright assistance to other groups dedicated to bringing revolution to the relatively backward nations of the peninsula.” (Ibid: 181).

The US, alarmed by the Soviet presence, was looking for a political and economic foothold there. “In order to counter the increased influence of the Bloc [the Eastern block], the US now undertook to convince Yemen that it needed a foreign-aid program. By mid-1957 the Department of State, perhaps with too much optimism, claimed that “promising discussions” were taking place.” (Ibid). But this kind of aid did not start until January 1959, when the US provided Yemen, with about 15,000 tons of grains and other foodstuffs. Also in the same year, the US supplied Yemen with some food and medical needs. (Ibid: 182). But, Imam Ahmed insisted on getting political support from the US against Great Britain. The US was still unwilling to give him this kind of support. As I mentioned above, America would support Imam Ahmed only economically. In essence this change was minimal.

Section B: The Yemeni 1962 Revolution¹¹

The September 1962 revolution in North Yemen proclaimed the creation of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). This revolution ended the Imamate rule of North Yemen, which had lasted for centuries. Unlike its unsuccessful predecessors of coup attempts and revolts (especially those of 1948 and 1955), this revolution had a better chance, thanks to the support of Gamal Abd al-Nasser--the leader of Egypt at the time and the inspiration brought about by the 1952 revolution in Egypt.¹² Beside Nasser's support, other factors contributed to the success of the revolution. Among those factors was the death of Imam Ahmed on September 18, 1962--just a week before the revolution broke out. Imam Muhammad al-Badr succeeded his father but could not control the country. Another catalyst for the revolution was the grassroots work of the Free Yemeni Movement's (FYM), especially of its leaders who were studying or in exile in Egypt.

However, the newly created Republic faced formidable challenges internally and externally. Internally, the deposed Imam was able to escape the revolution and flee the country to neighboring Saudi Arabia. In addition, political forces were divided on the question of the revolution and many tribes in the central and northern regions were willing to support the Republic. Others, however, supported the old regime and fought side by side with Imam al-Badr's forces. And still others were willing to sell allegiance to higher bidders. In addition, the Yemeni people in general were confused about the meaning, goals and legitimacy of the revolution because of the lack of preparatory work on the side of the revolutionaries. It is enough to know that most Yemenis at this point in time were illiterate. “The major additional source of support for the Imam came from elements of the population throughout the country that were disillusioned or disaffected with the republic and its policies. This faction included a few loose tribal groupings in the Tahama and some in the region South of Sana’a (in the western mountains)” (Wenner 1991: 132).

Externally, neighboring countries embraced the anti-revolutionary forces and Saudi Arabia provided financial and logistic support for the Royalists. Likewise, Jordan provided some technical and training support. Those regimes that sided with the Royalists of North Yemen did so because they shared with them similar conservative and monarchical regimes. They also despised the progressive anti-monarchy Arab nationalism. They saw in the Yemeni revolution another sign of Nasser's expansionism and a threat to the countries of the Arabian Peninsula. As for the British, they were afraid that a successful change in North Yemen would inspire the nationalist movement in the South to seek independence.¹³ The Saudis in particular were concerned with the long disputed borders between Yemen and Saudi Arabia since the 1934 war.

Because of these political realities, the YAR found itself in a prolonged civil war that lasted form 1962 until 1970. On the one side were the Royalists, supported by Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the Britain. On the other side were the Republicans supported by Nasser of Egypt, and to some extent the Soviet Union. In 1962, about 10,000 Egyptian troops arrived in Yemen. The Egyptian forces were given one assignment, which was to defend the Yemen revolution against the counterrevolutionary forces. This conflict over political power was also a conflict along religious lines with the majority of the Zaydis¹⁴ supporting the Royal family of Hamid al-Din, and most of the Shafis¹⁵ supporting the republican forces. (Wenner,1991). It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss the religious differences in Yemen and the impact of these differences on US-Yemen relations.

The September 1962 revolution in North Yemen presented the Kennedy Administration with a dilemma. For one, their major ally in the region at this point was Saudi Arabia. The Saudis were against the Yemeni revolution and saw it as a destabilizing factor on their Southern border. They saw Nasser's involvement in the preparation and defense of the revolution as evidence of his attempt to overthrow their regimes. The Saudis expected the US to oppose the Yemeni revolution and to do whatever possible to reinstall the deposed Imam.

On another side, the Americans viewed the Yemen revolution as something they could not oppose for at least several reasons. First, they knew the archaic, backward, and brutal nature of the Imams rule in Yemen and they knew that supporting it would send the wrong message to all people around the world. Second, they did not want the Soviets to seize the opportunity to support the revolution, and consequently secure a foothold in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula. It is worth mentioning that the Yemeni revolution took place at the height of the Cold War when both the Western and Eastern blocks were seeking to expand their alliances around the world. A third factor shaping the American response was the British presence in South Yemen and other opposition to the revolution in the North.

This situation created two opinions within the Kennedy administration on the question of Yemen. One of those opinions called for the reorganization of the Yemeni revolution. The other called for a delay to see how things would evolve. In some sense, advocates of the second position thought that the Yemeni revolution may eventually fall and recognition may end up as an embarrassment for the administration.

Americans were also concerned about their mission and personnel dispatched to provide technical assistance to Yemen. As Parker T. Hart pus it, "…the question of recognition of the new YAR government did not arise immediately in Washington, because the biggest concern was, what has happened to our own people and what are the status of those people? He added: Our earliest report made it quite clear that there should be no recognition until they treated us like a legation, gave us our security of communication, pouch, telegraph, protection to our personnel, diplomatic privilege. They were not giving them at first. They were trying to pressure us to recognize as the price of giving us these. We said, nothing doing. You will give us those privileges, and then we’ll think about it. And we held firm on that.” (Almadhagi, 1996:34). Finally, America's handling of the Yemeni question was also heavily influenced by President Kennedy's political beliefs and attitudes and his inclination towards supporting independent movements throughout the world.

As a result of all these factors, President Kennedy, in November, 1962, sent messages to the parties in the conflict (King Husayn of Jordan, Prince Faysal of Saudi, President Nasser of Egypt, and President al-Sallal of Yemen) wherein he asked them to work toward peace settlement of the conflict (Wenner 1967: 199). In these messages, President Kennedy called on parties to: 1- stop the war; 2- withdraw the Jordanian forces from the Saudi’s borders adjacent to Yemen; 3- call a halt on Saudi support to Royalist forces; 4- start a gradual withdrawal of Egyptian forces from Yemen; and 5- secure Yemen's respect of its neighbors and their political systems (J.K.C.S, 2001).

On the next day, Both Saudi Arabia and Egypt responded to President Kennedy's initiative. The Saudi King rejected Kennedy's proposal and declared that: 1- Imam Ahmed and his government were the legitimate rulers of Yemen; 2- the majority of Yemenis were in support of the deposed Imam; and 3- the Royalists force was on the verge of defeating the republican forces before the end of the winter (Wenner 1967: 200). The Egyptian response came also the following day through a piece in al-Ahram newspaper on November 28. The answer was a polite rejection of President Kennedy's initiative. Their response cited the following: 1- the Saudis were the aggressors; 2- Egypt's forces were playing a defensive rule against foreign invasion; 3- it was not the intention of Egypt or Yemen to destabilize the neighboring countries of the Peninsula; 4- Egypt was willing to withdraw forces if it was assured that the threats of foreign intervention in Yemen would cease. The Yemeni government's response came on December 9, 1962 during an interview with the Middle East News Agency. In the interview President al-Sallal said that the revolutionary regime in Sana'a had "no aggressive intentions against the Arab people in Hijaz" (Wenner 1967: 201).

US Recognition of the YAR

In the light of conflicting interests in the Yemeni conflict, the Kennedy administration moved in several directions. First, they assured their allies in the region, especially Saudi Arabia that recognition of the YAR would not affect its bilateral relations with them and would not mean a shift in US foreign policy in the region. It also assured the Saudis that the YAR did not represent a threat to them, but the real threat was coming from the Soviets and their allies. Second, the US government asked the Yemeni government to clearly state its intention to establish good relations with all its neighbors. The Yemeni government responded positively. On December 18, 1962, the Yemeni government announced that it would focus on developing the economic and social conditions and welfare of its people. It also affirmed its intention to establish good relations with all countries. In reference to the ongoing hostilities, there were justified as self-defense and not an attempt to export revolution. The government also said that one of the revolution’s doctrines was to respect all international treaties and commitments, including the Charters of the United Nations and the Arab League. It declared its inclination to live with its neighboring countries in peace (J.K.C.S 2001).

The Yemeni statement encouraged Washington in two ways: first it assured and neutralized the Kennedy administration's fear of the real intentions of the new government; and second, it made Washington speed up the recognition of the YAR. “Washington observed that most of the Arab and communist countries, including China, recognized the republic very quickly and that the Soviet Union had gained a considerable foothold in the area through the Yemeni revolution. The US could not neglect its allies in the area who were supporting the counter-revolution but the Kennedy administration was anxious to change world opinion about its associations with reactionary regimes for the sake of its interests.” (Almadhagi, 1996: 48).

On December 19, 1962, the US recognized the YAR--which was an important development for the newly created regime. Egypt welcomed America’s recognition and looked at it as a new diplomatic victory. On the other hand, the American recognition angered some other countries such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan. On December 20, 1962, many countries around the world followed suit with the American move and recognized the YAR. More than that, the United Nations decided to allow the representative of the Yemen Arab Republic to take the seat previously occupied by the MKOY's mission. After their recognition of Yemen, American officials tried to bring an end to the ongoing civil war in the country. They were motivated by the US interest in the region and the desire to maintain stability. However, the intra Yemen conflict continued and both the Saudis and the Egyptians supported their favorite side in the conflict.

The relations between the US and Yemen did not improve. The only positive development was the symbolic aid to Yemen provided by the US Agency for International Development (USAID), which started funding some programs in Yemen such as road construction and food shipments. After 1967, relations between the two countries deteriorated and Yemen broke ties with US because of the latter's support of Israel during the Six Days War.

Meanwhile, there were other developments taking place in South Yemen. In 1963--while the war in the North was continuing-- a revolution broke out in the South. Two groups revolted against the British colonization of the South: the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), and the National Liberation Front (NLF). Their demand was independence. Interestingly enough, the southern Yemeni's experience with social inequality under the British made them vulnerable to communist thinking. In 1967, the southern Yemen struggle was rewarded with the British decision to withdraw from South Yemen. Subsequently, South Yemen declared itself a Marxist State in 1969.

At this time, American officials were concerned with the vacuum the British would leave behind if they decided to withdraw from their colonies in the Arabian Peninsula, including South Yemen. They had a strong sense that the Soviets would take advantage of this void. They were consumed, however, with the Arab-Israeli conflict to the extent that they failed to take specific actions to deal with the spiraling events. As to the events in South Yemen, the radicals within the NFL managed to take over, and subsequently change the character of the state. They adopted Marxism-Leninism as the official ideology of the state--making South Yemen the first country in the Arab World to adopt Marxism--and changed the name of the country from the People’s Republic of South Yemen to the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) (J.K.C.S, 2001).

With this Soviet expansion, the US responded with the so-called Nixon Doctrine (named after President Richard Nixon 1969-1974). In this doctrine, the US adopted a new policy in the Middle East according to which it committed itself to protect all the countries of the Middle East from any nuclear threat--implicitly referring to the Soviet Union (Ibid). At the same time, the US refrained from sending any forces to the region to avoid the appearance of acting like the former colonial powers.¹⁶ Instead, the US government focused on befriending pro-West regimes in Saudi Arabia, Iran, and elsewhere. It sold them new technologies and helped them in many ways to consolidate power and create strong police states (Ibid). It is worth mentioning that the alliance between oil, political Islam, and American imperialism was created during the decade of the 1960s with the Saudis playing a key role in providing the ideological cover as well as the financial cost of this endeavor. This alliance made headways when it defeated Arab nationalism by the end of the 1960 and it would mobilize its forces to defeat communism as well.

Section C. The 1970s and 1980s

The Yemeni American relations suffered a setback between 1967-1972 because of the perceived American bias against Arabs and its unconditional support of Israel in the Six-Day War of June 1967. On July 1^st. 1972, the US Secretary of State William P. Rogers visited Sana’a--the capital of YAR, and it was the first step toward improving the relations between the two countries (J.K.C.S, 2001). During his visit, Secretary Rogers announced that the US police toward Yemen (and other countries in the region) would be based on Yemen’s acquiescence to the US policy in the region. “At a dinner in his honor on the night of his arrival, Rogers said that his country intended to continue its efforts to promote a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, based on full implementation of the UN Security Council resolution of November 1967, number 242” (Almadhagi, 1996: 91).

Rogers' visit was followed by two developments. First, the US government appointed William R. Crawford on October 12, 1972 as the first US ambassador to the YAR (US Department of State 2003). Second, the Yemeni government on January 29, 1973 approved an agreement proposed by the US embassy in Sana'a in September 1972 that would allow Peace Corps volunteers to work in the country (Ibid: 92). The first group of American volunteers would arrive in Yemen in 1973. After a short period of cold relations resulting from the US support of Israel in the October, 1973 war, US-Yemen relations resumed once again. On April 20 of the same year, the US government resumed its economic assistance program in the country. "The restoration of relations between Sana’a and Washington also opened the YAR to US scholars, journalists and politicians who furthered American understanding of the country.” (Ibid: 92).

It is worth noting, however, that during the 1970s and most of the 1980s the US policy towards Yemen was characterized by the following. First, the US government maintained minimal interest in the Yemeni Affairs. Second, the US government gave the Saudis the upper hand in handling the Yemeni question. Most of the interactions between the US and Yemen were usually channeled through Riyadh. This American approach to their relations with Yemen can be explained by the fact that Americans viewed Yemen as a very complex and mysterious place. Had they acquired interest in the YAR, it would have been an expensive endeavor for them in a country that was viewed as marginal in the US strategy. This was evident by the amount of economic and military aid provided to Yemen during the 1970s. The average total of annual American aid between 1975-1980 was about $10 million (J. K. C. S. 2002: 15)¹⁷

Third, Americans knew that their interest in containing communism in South Yemen was profoundly shared by the Saudis. On their part, the Saudis also were very much interested in sealing the YAR from foreign powers and reserving it as one their spheres of influence. They were also willing to invest their resources to defend the YAR and themselves against the communist tide, and to do the US bidding. In other words, it was beneficial for both the Saudis and the Americans to channel relations between US and Yemen through Riyadh.

“All this occurred in the wake of the October 1973 Arab-Israel war, which created an oil boom and gave Saudi Arabia a great opportunity to exert influence in the Middle East. It was evident that the wealthier Saudis, encouraged by the US, became more influential in the YAR and more dependent on it for their labors force and, consequently, more able and more willing to attempt to contain USSR in the PDRY and the Red Sea region”. (Almadhagi, 1996:94). The Saudi policy towards Yemen beads, according to Gause (1990: 1) was based on a saying by King Abd al-Azizl--the founder of Saudi Arabia-- to his sons before his death "the good or evil for us [the Saudi royal family] will come from Yemen.”

In accordance with this policy, American officials turned a deaf ear to Sana'a's attempts to acquire weapons and to strengthen relations with the US.¹⁸ American officials knew of the Saudi sensitivity to arming their republican neighbor to the South. The only instance in which the US government acquiesced to the Yemeni demand (approved by the Saudis) was when the two Yemens (YAR and the PDRY) confronted each other in a full-scale war in 1979.

Conclusion

Historically, the US relations with the MKOY were constrained by US-British relations. While the Imams (Yahya and Ahmed) sought political and military support vis-à-vis the British colonist in South Yemen, the US consecutive governments were not willing to upset the British. As a result, they turned down the Imams' requests for military and political support. Instead, they were willing to offer some economic and technical aid in exchange for the Imam's halt to relations with the Soviets.

After the overthrow of the Imamate rule in the North and the creation of the YAR, the Kennedy administration's policy was constrained by several factors. First, the dynamics of the Cold War pushed the Kennedy administration in the direction of recognizing the YAR and admitting it to the UN instead of opposing the revolution. Well aware of the archaic, despotic, and backward nature of the imamate rule, American officials thought that if they failed to support the revolution, they would be sending the wrong message to independence movements around the world. They also feared that the Soviet Union would exploit the situation and put itself in support of the revolution and as a result might have gained a foothold in the Arabian Peninsula.

Second, the US government also recognized Saudi Arabia as a major ally for the US because of the vital US interest in the Saudi oil. As a result, American officials did not want to upset the Saudis or appear that they were encouraging destabilizing forces to flourish in their backyard. Third, the US government, although aware of the British dilemma in southern Yemen, tried to appease the British, especially in the early years of the 1960s.

As a result of these constraints, the US policy during the 1960s, 1970s, and most of the 1980s can be summarized in the following. First way, the US recognized the YAR and incorporated it into the international community in order to block the road in front of the Soviets and prevent them from gaining influence in Yemen. Second, it sought to moderate the revolutionary groups by asking them as a condition for recognition to affirm their intention to respect the integrity, sovereignty and the political regimes of their neighbors. In particular, it asked them to declare that they had no intention of exporting the Yemeni revolution to neighboring countries. Third, it assured the Saudis who were in opposition to regime change in Yemen (and were actively supporting the Royalists) that the US would protect them against any threat.

Fourth, when the civil war in North Yemen ended with a national reconciliation and the independence war in the South ended with the withdrawal of the British forces and the installation of a Marxist regime, US officials found it beneficial to let the Saudis exclusively handle the Yemeni questions. This was partially because of the cost involved, and partially to appease the Saudis.

Fifth, the American policy of letting the Saudis contains the communist threat in southern Yemen continued throughout the 1970s and most of the 1980s. The American attitude (as discussed in chap 3) would challenge when the two Yemens decided to merge as one country and sought the US approval of such a project.

III: The Yemeni Unification and the US Position

Introduction

The unification of Yemen on May 22,1990 represented an important development locally, regionally and internationally. As such, it was of interest to many actors in the world including the United States. This chapter seeks to analyze the causes and processes of the Yemeni unification and the US policy and role in the process. It is divided into three sections. Section I discusses the forces that pushed the divided Yemen towards unity. Section II briefly addresses the steps taken towards unity. Section III analyzes US policy on the Yemeni unification.

Section A. Causes of Yemen Unity

As discussed in chapter 2, by the end of 1960s, two states emerged in the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula: the YAR and the PDRY. One of them--the PDRY-- became the first and only Arab state to adopt communism in the Arab world, and the second--the YAR--adopted a pro-Saudi and pro-West line. Because of the ideological differences, the relationship between the two Yemens throughout the 1970s and most of the 1980s were characterized by suspicions, competition, and a desire to take over the other.

In 1972, the PDRY and the YAR found themselves clashing in a brief proxy war that lasted from September 26 till October 13 (Almadhagi 1996: 93). The causes for this war are many but the superpower rivalry was a key factor in the conflict. The Saudis also played a role because they wanted to weaken both the YAR and the PDRY by having them fight each other. It is also worth mentioning that by 1972, the YAR had become a destination for conservative forces opposing the regime in the PDRY. Likewise, the PDRY received and supported the leftist elements opposing the conservative regime in the YAR (Ibid. 93). According to Kostiner (1996: 14), both Saudi Arabia and the YAR encouraged the southern Yemeni exiles to "infiltrate," the PDRY. In response, the PDRY forces launched a counterattack targeting the military bases of these exiles across the borders of the PDRY. Interestingly enough, the aftermath negotiations in Tripoli--mediated by the Arab League-- resulted in the "Tripoli Agreement" in November 1972. In this agreement, the sides declared their intention to unite their two countries and, for that purpose, to draft a constitution in one year period (Ibid: 14).

However, no major steps were taken to achieve unity. Instead, the Cold War between the two Yemens continued with the Saudis throwing their support behind the YAR and the Soviets backing the PDRY. In the Mid-1970s, President al-Hamdi started making rapprochement with the South as part of his project of modernizing and uniting Yemen, but his efforts were not well received locally, regionally or internationally. As a result, the three forces coalesced against al-Hamdi and perpetuated his assassination in 1977.

In his place, Ahmed al-Ghashmi took over. The southern leadership took the assassination of al-Hamdi as directed against the Yemeni unity and part of the Cold War games. As a result, it plotted the assassination of al-Ghashmi in June 1978, just a few months after he rose to the presidency.

The demise of al-Ghashmi triggered a second major military confrontation between the YAR and the PDRY in February 1979. Like the previous confrontation in 1972, this one ended with the two countries meeting in Kuwait and agreeing to work towards unity. Meanwhile, the National Democratic Front (NDF)—a coalition of North Yemeni politicians who opposed the regime in the North won the support of the PDRY leadership. During the second half of the 1980s, domestic, regional and international factors interacted and shaped Yemen’s move towards unity.

Domestic Factors

To understand the occurrence of Yemeni unity, one needs to focus on: the southern and the northern contexts. In the southern context, there were several developments, which encouraged the leadership of the PDRY to work towards unity.

First of all, since the independence of South Yemen and the creation of the PDRY as a communist state, bloody power struggle between different factions had been one of the major characteristics of politics in the country. Even after the creation of the YSP in 1978-as an amalgamation of different political forces within the country. This infighting within the PDRY leadership led to the execution of President Salim Rubay Ali in 1978. In 1986, a power struggle among different factions within the YSP resulted in a brief civil war between two factions. Ali Nasser Mohammad,¹⁹ the head of the state and the Secretary General of the YSP had a different approach to relations with neighboring countries including YAR, Saudi Arabia, and Oman. Others in party and the state’s leadership viewed this approach as compromising the socialist ideals including the policy of supporting revolutionary movements. They also saw Mohammad’s personal power rapidly in violation of the collective leadership of the party principles. When they called for a meeting on January 13, 1986 to discuss Mohammad’s leadership style, he sent his guards who opened fire and killed most of them instantly.

With some of them surviving Nasser’s plot, a civil war broke out and lasted for about two weeks. The results of the war were devastating to the country. For one, the old generation of leaders was purged: Mohammad--accompanied by thousands of his supporters—fled the country to North Yemen; other top leaders were killed either in Mohammad’s initial strike on January 13 or in the ensuing fight. This purge of leadership led to the rise of a new more idealistic and less experienced leadership led by Ali Salim al-Baid. Another outcome of the war was the destruction of the PDRY’s army, which was one of the best-trained and equipped armies in the Peninsula. There were other economic, social and cultural impacts from civil war. All in all, it discredited the socialist context of the country and opened the door wide for ordinary citizens (and some leaders) to rethink their strategies. Al-Baid—the new leader—initiated a period of economic and political liberalization that would help in the push towards unity.

The second factor contributing to the move towards unity was the economic downturn, which was caused mainly by the decline of remittances and foreign aid—the two pillars of the PDRY’s economy. The reasons for declining of rent (both aid and remittances) can be attributed primarily to forces beyond the control of the PDRY’s leadership. On the one hand, structural changes in labor markets in recipients’ countries²⁰ accompanied by declining of oil prices meant less money was coming to the country. On the other hand, the Soviet Union was experiencing economic difficulties and the flow of support to satellite countries was in decline. In short, South Yemen was experiencing the same effects experienced elsewhere in the developing world. The civil war of 1986 exacerbated the situation. The impact on the PDRY, however, was deeper due to socialist structure of its economy, and the role-played by the state in the distribution and production of wealth.

Likewise, there were many domestic factors in play in the YAR, which facilitated unity. Politically, Ali Abdullah Saleh who became president of the YAR in 1978 had by the late 1980s consolidated his power and was in a strong position to seek unity without fearing for his political survival. The economy of the YAR also suffered a major setback during the 1980s after booming during the 1970s thanks to foreign aid and remittances. When oil markets took a nosedive and the structure of labor markets changed during the 1980s changed, the Yemeni economy fall into crisis. Despite the discovery of oil, the YAR economy continued to deteriorate.

Regional Factors

In addition to the domestic factors, regional factors also played an important role. For the leadership in the YAR, it wanted to achieve Yemeni unity to contain the threat of disintegration and chaos in the PDRY. In their reasoning, in the absence of unity, trouble in the South could very well spill over to the north. This analysis was based on historical evidence that whatever happens in either part of Yemen would eventually have consequences on the other. View the situation the PDRY (as the only communist country in the Arab World) was regionally isolated and its relations with neighboring countries including the YAR were antagonistic. When Iraq, Egypt, Jordan and the YAR founded the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), South Yemen felt more isolated. Likewise, the YAR, during the 1980s, suffered some sort of regional negligence. Although president Saleh was supported by the Saudis when he took over in 1978, his attempts to balance the Saudi influence by strengthening his relations with the Soviets, derailing for oil, and strengthening his relations with Iraq, especially by the late 1980s, were not welcome. The Saudis viewed with suspicion the creation of the ACC. The reasons are multiple but the border dispute between Yemen and Saudi Arabia was a major factor. The Saudis saw this alliance among powerful countries in the Arab world as threatening to their national security.

For both the YAR and the PDRY, creating a strong country was the desire of both YAR and the PDRY to join hands and establish strong country in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula that could withstand the Saudi pressure, especially in border negotiations.

International Factors

The most important development at the international level was the weakening and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. It is worth noting that the relations between the YAR and the PDRY were strained by the dynamics of the Cold War. Not surprisingly, the changes in that dynamic helped the two Yemens achieve unity. First, Mikhail Gorbachev rose to power with four principles; 1- Perestroika (restructuring); 2- Glasnost (openness); 3- democracy; 4- new thinking in foreign policy. Those four principles especially the last one had an impact the Soviet allies including the PDRY. Gorbachev’s message to friends and allies was simple: don’t relay on us to sponsor you. This message meant that the USSR left his allies to deal with their economic problems. It also meant that they should carry out certain reforms. In Eastern Europe, communist regimes that had relied on the Soviets for protection against insurgencies were now vulnerable to the threat of collapse. For the leadership of the PDRY, without the Soviet military, economic, security and political backing, the country would be in great danger.

Section B. The US Stance

As noted in chapter 2, US-Yemen relations were channeled through Saudi Arabia during the 1970s and the 1980s. Even when the two Yemens got to confrontation, the leadership of the YAR had to go to the Saudis to ask them to convince Americans to sell northern Yemenis badly needed military equipment. The Americans agreed to sell the YAR a $500 million worth of weapons with the bill paid by the Saudis and the weapons shipped to Riyadh, the Saudis delayed the delivery. Although the Saudis wanted the YAR to be stronger and able to stop the PDRY's influences, they did not want it to be a threat to the Saudi national security (al-Hissamy: 147). The Saudi reluctance, accompanied by the threat to the YAR presented by the NDF forced Saleh to visit Moscow in October 28, 1979 to purchase weapons (Ibid. 147; Almadhagi: 116). He managed to get the Soviets to sell Yemen a $500 million worth of weapons.²¹

The second notable development in US-Yemen relations during the 1980s was American oil investment. One outcome of the Iraq Iran war which started in 1980 was the creation of a Western (mainly American at the beginning) interest in Yemen’s oil. Yemen Hunt Oil Company (YHOC) started exploration in the early 1980s. This interest by Hunt led to improvement in the bilateral relations. In April 1986, then vice president, George Bush, visited Yemen and partook in the start initiation of oil production. This visit to Sana’a was the first strong step towards improving the Yemeni-American relations. As table 3.1 illustrates, improvements in bilateral relations resulted an increase in US aid.

Table 3.1 US Aid to YAR

Source: Almadhagi (1996: 130).

This, however, annoyed Riyadh, which said that Marib’s oil was on its borders (Almadhagi, 1996:123).

In terms of inter Yemeni relations, the election of President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s meant a strong anti-communist line. This was evident in the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan and elsewhere. In handling the communist threat in Yemen, the US continued to rely on Saudi Arabia. The Saudis, in turn, saw that best strategy to counter communism in South Yemen, Afghanistan and elsewhere was to strengthen Islamic forces through the creation of Islamic schools.

When the two Yemens started by the late 1980s the process of unification, the American stance on the initiative was overall supportive for many reasons. First, American officials did not see the unification of Yemen as expanding the communist territory; by contrast they saw it as the disintegration of the South into the North (YAR). They had strong reasons to believe in this outcome. The intra part conflict in the PDRY in South Yemen made Americans believe that the communist regime in the PDRY was on the verge of collapse (Hudson 1997: 167). Also, the fact that the population of the YAR was about five times the population of the PDRY assured policy makers in DC of beneficial results in their favor. Second, the PDRY was classified by Washington as a “terrorist” state and as a result they saw in the unification of the two countries a peaceful approach to deradicalize the southern Yemeni leadership. It is also another way of ensuring that communism was over once and for all in the part of the world.

Third, “Washington was of the opinion that unity was deeply desired by Yemenis from both North and South and might lead to reducing tension in an arena that had experienced two border wars and several episodes of internal subversion and assassination” (Hudson 1997: 168). This realization was important because it was not in the interest of the US to oppose a deeply embedded goal in the Yemeni mind. Fourth, unity was also viewed as economically beneficial for both Yemen and the US because the latter had already had some corporations working the oil fields in Yemen. It also meant that the US would have a larger market in the case of a united Yemen with a population equivalent to the whole population of the Arabian Peninsula. Fifth, support of Yemeni unity was viewed in Washington as enhancing stability in the region by eliminating one of the causes of tension in the area.

Sixth, Americans were also assured by a visit—the first of its kind by a Yemeni President--paid by President Saleh to Washington D.C. in January 1990. Saleh visited Washington with the main goal of assuring Americans that Yemeni unity would not serve as a destabilizer in the region. In contrast, it would represent the end of both Marxism and terrorism in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula, strengthen security and stability in the region, and served the interests of all those concerned (Monasser 2002: 222; al-Qarby: 11). It is worth noting, however, American officials faced a situation more or less similar to the one the Kennedy administration faced in 1962. While Americans supported the Yemeni bid towards unity, they had to struggle with the Saudi opposition to such project without alienating Saudi Arabia. Like their efforts in 1962, American officials tried to convince the Saudis that the Yemeni unity was in the interest of stability in the Arabia because it would eliminate an “avowedly hostile to Saudi Arabia” (Hudson 1997: 168).

Conclusion

There were domestic, regional, and international factors that facilitated the unification of Yemen by the end of the 1990. Like the German unity, Yemeni unity resulted mainly from the profound change in the structure of the international system. The decline of the Soviet Union and Gorbachev’s reforms led to parallel reforms in other communist countries. The PDRY, the client of the USSR, found itself in a difficult position, partially because of domestic factors--including the infighting within the party in 1986—and partly because of the decline in foreign aid from the USSR.

The US position on the Yemeni unity was shaped by its desire to bring an end to the communist regime in South Yemen and to make sure that the country (the PDRY) that was classified as a terrorist state by the US government would no longer exist. Another factor contributing to US support was the American desire for stability in the Arabian Peninsula. By the end of the 1980s, American companies had already had investment in most of the Arabian Peninsula including Yemen. American policy makers viewed stability as an important condition for economic development in the region and also for normalization with Israel. In addition, the US as the world’s only hegmon was and is still concerned with the flow of oil from that region to world markets.

To neutralize the Saudi fears, American policy makers assured the Saudis (based on President Saleh’s commitment) that Yemeni unity would not serve as a threat to the Saudi national security.

IV. The Gulf War and the Yemeni Position

Introduction

This chapter is devoted to the Yemeni stance on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the presence of foreign forces, and the impact of the Yemeni position on US-Yemen relations. Its major argument is that despite the Yemeni stance on the invasion of Iraq and the presence of foreign troops in the region, the US government accepted Sana'a’s adjustment of position.

Section A. The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait and the International Coalition

Between 1980 and 1988, Iraq found itself in a prolonged war. To understand the causes of the second Gulf War, one ought to go to the Iran-Iraq War. The Iran-Iraq War was triggered by the Iranian Revolution of 1979. This Islamic Revolution represented a threat to Iraq, Gulf countries and the West. The threat to Iraq, in particular, emanated from the fact that the Iraqi regime was secular while the new regime installed by the Islamic revolution in Iran was Islamic. Also, the dominant political force in Iraq was a Sunni group despite the fact that the Shiite population was larger. With Iran home to almost 85 percent of the world Shiis, the Iraqi leadership felt that the Iraqi Shiis might be encouraged by the new regime in power to revolt. In addition, there were also historical factors contributing the animosity between the two countries. The threat to Gulf countries was that the new leadership in Iran appeared to be keen on exporting its ideology to other countries. The Iraqi leaders said that they were protecting most of the Arab nations from the Iranian Islamic inspired revolution. For the West, especially the United States, the American backing of the Shah of Iran left a strong resentment of America as demonstrated by the embassy incident in which students took American diplomats hostages for about a year. Because of this, Iraq was supported by Gulf countries, Arab countries in general and the United States. The US, in particular, who disliked both Islamism (as represented by Iran), and Arab nationalism (as represented by Iraq),²² thought that having the countries destroy each other was not a bad idea after all.

To the surprise of many, the Iran-Iraq war ended with Iraq emerging as a military power in the region. It was obvious that the Iraqi leadership had used the billions of dollars channeled from neighboring countries to build a strong army. This army became a threat to neighboring countries and to Western interests in the region, and of course to Israel, a country whose security is guaranteed by the United States. After Saddam’s speech on April 2, 1990, the US recognized that Iraq was developing new weapons (especially nuclear) and that made officials in Washington very concerned about the Iraqi power. The Zionist lobby in Washington was very alarmed by Saddam’s statement in which he said: “I swear to God we will let our fire eat half of Israel if it tries to wage anything against Iraq.” (Leventhal and Dolle November 29, 1998). I n the same speech, Saddam mentioned that his military equipment, including chemical weapons, could compare to those owned by the USSR and the US.

In an ironic shift, Saddam’s supporters in the 1980s became his foes in the early 1990s. There were strong indications that those foes conspired to weaken Iraq in several ways. Kuwait asked Iraq, which by the end of the war had enormous economic problems, to pay back loans given to Iraq during the war. It was also alleged that some countries in the region, including Kuwait started exceeding their quotas (which were determined by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries OPEC) in order to bring oil prices down and make it hard for the Iraqi economy to recover. They were doing so on the advice of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). With rich deposits of oil straddled the ill-defined border, Iraq constantly claimed that Kuwait oilrigs were illegally tapping into Iraqi oil fields. Apart from the conspiracy to dump oil markets or the allegation that Kuwait was stealing the Iraqi oil, Iraq had long considered Kuwait to be a part of historical Iraq. President Saddam Hessian was also interested in controlling the flow of oil in the area so that he could be able to control oil prices.

With the escalation the crisis between Iraq and Kuwait, several attempts were made to mediate a solution. Those attempts failed. On August 2^nd, 1990, less than three months from the date of the unification of Yemen, the Iraqi troop took over Kuwait in less than six hours and as a result initiated a major regional and international crisis. The Kuwaiti government, including the Emir, fled to neighboring Saudi Arabia. The chain of events quickly developed with the US pushing towards the internationalization of the conflict. The regional efforts to contain the crisis through the Arab League failed and the US took over.

Using the United Nations as a cover, the US was able to build a coalition to liberate Kuwait. The following nations were involved militarily in the war: Kuwait, United States, Saudi Arabia, Great Britain, France, The Netherlands, Egypt, Syria, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Canada, Belgium, and Italy. Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Honduras, Niger, Romania, and South Korea also supported the U.S. led war, and provided intelligence or other means to the U.N. No nation helped Iraq militarily, but Jordan and Yemen gave moral support to Iraq.

The most surprising of these nations was Jordan. Long considered the closest ally in the Arab World to the U.S., Jordan's King Hussein condemned the American bombardment on February 6, and offered moral support to Iraq. Jordan believed that the U.S. was fighting the war to help Israel, a U.S. ally in the region and long time foe of the Arab states.

In the Israel-Arab conflict, Hussein saw an opportunity to gain support. He retaliated against the war by launching SCUD missiles into Israel. Hussein believed that if he could provoke Israel into retaliating, most of the other Arab states would come to Iraq's aid, thus strengthening Iraq in the war. Israel suffered some casualties, and came very close to retaliating, but the U.S. was able to convince it not to.

Section B. Yemen’s Position on the Iraqi Invasion and Foreign Presence

The Yemeni connection to Iraq developed during the 1980s. The strengthening of relations between the two countries can be attributed on one hand to President Saleh’s desire to find allies beyond Saudi Arabia. The Iran- Iraq war provided president Saleh with a golden opportunity, for it allowed him to send Yemeni troops to Iraq in a symbolic show of solidarity. This symbolic move would later result in full-fledged political, military and economic cooperation. It is also worth mentioning that there had been a strong Iraqi-orientated Ba'athism in North Yemeni politics due largely to the Iraqi influence on Yemen students attending Iraqi universities.

The 1980s witnessed several developments within the Arabic regional system. Apart from the isolation imposed on Egypt after its lonely peace with Israel and from the breakout of the Iran-Iraq war, there was another development of significance in the region. It was the creation in 1981 of the so-called the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—a regional organization that included Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirate and Oman. Although this organization would prove ineffective in terms of political and security issues, it was viewed by many as a slap in the face of the Arabic regional system. One reason for this was the fact that the GCC was a parallel organization to the Arab League and as such it only deepened the regional distrust and division. Another reason was that this new organization included only the rich countries in the region; Yemen was excluded despite its geographic a proximity to GCC members. A third reason was that Iraq was excluded despite its geographical association—being a gulf country. President Saddam of Iraq viewed the creation of GCC and the exclusion of Iraq as a betrayal. Yemen also felt that the creation of the GCC would only institutionalize the Saudi hegemony over other countries in the Gulf and make it difficult for the Yemeni leadership to balance the Saudi influence on its soil. That is why Iraq became a strong possible ally for Yemen.

By the end of the Iran -Iraq war president Saddam Hessian wanted to retaliate from those countries that had formed the GCC and excluded Iraq from membership. Hessian envisioned a parallel organization. The formation of the Arab Co-operation Council in 1989, consisting of Iraq, Yemen, Egypt and Jordan, was seen by some as the birth of a new alliance, which could one day challenge the GCC. There is also no doubt that president Hessian encouraged Yemeni unification - to the extent that some have claimed, in the light of the invasion of Kuwait a few months later, that it was intended as a building-block in his regional master-plan. When the two Yemens moved towards unity, the leadership of Iraq backed Yemeni unity unification and used its military and political leverage to pressure the Saudis to accept the Yemeni unity.

Yemen, as a country, with very close relations with the Iraqi regime at that point, found itself at the heart of the regional and international storm. When the Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait, Yemen had no immediate clear policy but Sana’a’s heart was with Baghdad. This was clear from Yemen’s behavior in the following days. First, when the Arab League called for a meeting of Arab Ministers in Cairo to discuss the Iraqi invasion, the Republic of Yemen along with Sudan, Tunisia, Jordan, and the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) called for a regional solution to the crisis. Second, Yemen-which happened to be a rotating member in the United Security Council during the invasion—abstained from voting on the UNSC resolution 660 on August 2^nd, 1990 which denounced the Iraqi invasion and demanded the withdrawal of forces. Yemen’s voting in general was in favor of Iraq as table 4.1 illustrates.

Table 4.1: Yemen’s Voting on the UN Resolutions Concerning Iraq

Third, president Saleh’s language in interviews, especially when talking about Iraq and president Hessian showed an inclination towards Iraq. President Saleh frequently described President Saddam Hussein of Iraq as "an excellent Arab leader" and "a fine Arab nationalist" (Miller October 26, 1990). Fourth, domestic actions indicated support of Iraq on both official and popular levels. The formation of the People’s Committee for the Defense of Iraq and the Arab Nation is a case in point. The committee aimed at: 1- mobilization of popular forces in support of Iraq and in resistance of western imperialism; 2- enhancement of the Yemeni unification as the first building block towards a comprehensive Arab unity; 3- enhancement of cooperation between Arab and Muslim countries. (al-Mutawakel 2002: 152). This committee was supposed to be representative of the popular response but one cannot miss the fact that the committee was headed by people from the two ruling parties. At the same time, another committee headed by sheik Abdullah al-Ahmer, the head of the Yemeni Congregation of Reform (Known by its Arabic name Islah-reform) was formed on December 18, 1990. This committee took a position supportive of Kuwait in its ordeal under the Iraqi occupation. Yet this committee was not as popular as the first. The Yemeni people and some officials believed that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was part of a Western conspiracy that aimed to destroy the Iraqi military and control oil sources.

It is important to note, however, that the Yemeni leadership repeatedly denied supporting Iraq. As early as October 1990, President Saleh stated that his country was neutral and that he had had conversations with President Hussein and other Arab leaders in an effort to "contain the crisis" started by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on Aug 2^nd (Miller October 26, 1990). A report issued by the Yemeni Ministry of Foreign Affairs on February 13, 1991 formulated the Yemeni position as follows:

1. Yemen’s rejection of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and its demand of Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.


2. Yemen’s rejection of foreign military intervention in the region and its demands for a peaceful regional solution.


3. The denunciation of the allied forces’ attack on Iraq and the destruction of its military and civilian infrastructure.


4. Yemen’s support for a comprehensive review of all regional conflict and its support of the Iraqi initiative of August 12,1990 which refused the double standards used by international powers to deal with Middle East issues.

In a lengthy interview with a Kuwaiti newspaper in June 1993, President Saleh expressed similar views. He explained that Yemen had actually opposed the Iraqi invasion, attempted to stop it and afterwards tried to convince the Iraqis to withdraw their forces. Saleh maintained that Yemen had sought an “Arab solution” to the invasion rather than a military operation carried out mainly by Western powers. Yemen affirmed that Yemen had meant no harm to Kuwait and sympathized with the suffering of the Kuwaiti people.

Yemen did indeed try to play the role of mediator by proposing a six- point peace plan on January 14,1990, before the start of the Desert Storm operation, calling for a withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait in return for the cessation of hostile acts by foreign forces against Iraq and the lifting of UN sanctions. Yemen issued another six-point plan on January 21, after the fighting had begun, calling on the UN to halt the war and permit Arab mediation of the conflict. But this formal position could not hide Yemen’s clear inclination to side with Iraq (Kostiner, 1996: 51-52).

Meanwhile, critics of the Yemeni position, especially in Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf countries would allege that Saleh, in 1990, had held up Saddam’s Iraq as a model for Yemen in military development and technological advances. Not only that but President Saleh, as they allege, was in the process of making a Saddam like leader out of himself after achieving the Yemeni unity. Critics would also point out that this policy suffered several shortcomings. For one, it was too little too late. For another, it was an unsuccessful attempt to balance Yemen’s position on the crisis in a time when Yemen had already suffered a great deal of loss.

Section 3. The Impact on US-Yemen Relations

Yemen’s stance on the crisis did not make the US happy. This was mostly because Yemen (otherwise less important) happened to be sitting on the UNSC’s bench. To convince Yemen—the only Arab country in the UNSC-- to support a UN resolution on the use of force against Iraq, the American secretary of State at the time, James Baker, visited Sana’a, the capital of the ROY (Republic of Yemen). He was the highest-ranking American official to visit the ROY since the unification of the country in 1990. Baker’s visit did not achieve its goals and after a two hour meeting, President Saleh came out of the meeting critical of the military build-up in the region. Saleh said that foreign troops had "complicated the problem rather than solved it" (AP November 23, 1990:18). According to al-Zindani (2002: 55), during the meeting between President Saleh and Secretary Baker, the latter offered Yemen $25 million as a price for Yemen’s vote in the UNSC.

When Yemen voted against UNSC Resolution 678 (issued on November 29, 1990), the American Ambassador to the UN at the time described the Yemeni vote as the most expensive vote that Yemen has ever cast. A few days later, the US cut off millions in aid to Yemen, one of the poorest countries in the world. Saudi Arabia expelled 800,000 Yemeni “guest” workers. (Selfa 1999:3)

Table 4.2: US Aid to Yemen 1987-1992

Source: EIU 1996-97: 75

The American side did not accept the Yemeni position on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and they made public their disapproval from the onset. Between 1990 and 1993, the relations between the US and Yemen cooled down. The United States as a punishment for Yemen’s position in the UNSC after the invasion reduced its presence in Yemen, canceled military cooperation as well as nonhumanitarian assistance and the Peace Corps program (US Department of State, 2002). In this regard the USAID reduced its funding to programs in Yemen to $2.9 million (Ibid.) but food assistance through the PL 480²⁴ and export enhancement programs continued.

V. Yemen’s Civil War and the US Stance

Introduction

If the Yemeni unity was a surprise, the civil war was not. Four years after the unification, there were strong reasons to believe that the war was almost inevitable. This chapter is divided into two sections: the first looks at the circumstances leading to this war and the second examines the US position on the war.

Section A. Causes of Yemen’s Civil War

The first and most important factor leading to the Civil War was the fact that upon the unification of Yemen on May 22, 1990, the two ruling groups in North and South Yemen kept control of their separate armies. Although publicly, they repeatedly assured their countrymen that the army had been united, in reality, the new country (the ROY) had two armies with two centers of command. (Monassar, 2002: 227).

Second, despite the differences between the YAR and the PDRY in terms of population, on the eve of the unification, power was divided evenly between the two parties. Aside from the economic and administrative problems, which were created by the new arrangements, the 50/50 division of power would serve as a time bomb that exploded after the first elections in the country. This was caused by the results of the April 1993 elections in which (as table 1 indicates) the YSP gained only 58 seats (Carapico 1993). . The YSP rivals—the GPC and Islah gained 62 and 123 seats respectively. An important aspect to the results was that, seats were distributed along preunfication lines with most seats in the former PDRY going to the YSP and most seats in the YAR going to YAR.

Table 5: 1: Distribution of Seats in the Yemeni Parliament Following the 1993 Elections

Source: EIU (2001) Pg 7.

In the aftermath of the elections a coalition government was formed. While the YSP retained the position of Prime Minstar in the post-1993 government, its share of cabinet portfolios dropped from 14 in the cabinet, formed in 1990, to 8 in the cabinet formed after the 1993 elections. The YSP also lost the position of Speaker of Parliament, which went to Sheik Abdullah al-Ahmer, the head of Islah (Al-faqih 2003).

Since democracy was perceived by both the GPC and the YSP as the vehicles to achieve political hegemony, the failure of the YSP to muster a majority, or at least to balance the northern GPC and Islah parties, led to the ensuing political crisis. At the same time, the GPC moved to consolidate its electoral victory over the YSP by attempting to marginalize (or to oust the party from its pre-election position). This happened at a time in which the YSP shared power 50/50 with the GPC including sustaining its own military, security and intelligence apparatuses.

Third, while the ROY of Yemen adopted, on the eve of the unification, a democratic system, those in power wanted democracy to serve their interests. The thinking appeared to have been that democracy was good as long as it guaranteed a position in power. Both sides in Yemen’s unity had reasons to believe that in a democratic system they would end up as the winners. The YSP leaders thought their popularity in the North as modernizers and administrators would win them an overwhelming majority in the upcoming elections. In its turn, the GPC leaders thought that their population advantage in the new state would allow them to control power and have the upper hand in running the country.

Fourth, the two parties to Yemeni unity did not trust each other because of fundamental ideological differences. The GPC was more inclined to the right and the YSP to the left. Along with these ideological differences the relations between the two Yemens--as explained in previous chapters--were often tense and the two countries had full scale wars in two instances: in 1972 and in 1979.

Fifth, the transition period also contributed to the Civil War. Although the purpose of this period was to allow each party to penetrate the other side and prepare itself for elections, it led to the strain of relations between the two parties. Sixth, there was a wave of terror targeting members of the YSP. Rank and file of the YSP suspected their allies in the YSP of sponsoring this wave to weaken and terrorize the party. al-Baid, the Secretary General of the YSP accused president Saleh’s forces of this campaign of violence against leaders of his party.

Seventh, the discovery of oil in the southern region in commercial quantities immediately after the unification encouraged the southern leaders to take a hard position in their negotiations with the northern leadership. As table 5.5 shows, Yemen production and export of oil increased dramatically.

Table 5: 2: Yemeni Oil Production, barrels per day

Source: Nonneman: 93.

Finally, by 1994 the Yemeni economy had deteriorated and an economic crisis struck most Yemenis. The causes of this crisis were many and some of them were rooted in the structural imbalances in the system. Political corruption, however, contributed to the deepening of the crisis. First, after the Unification thousands of people were added to the state pay roll. The southerners wanted everyone in the South to have a job, and the northern wanted to balance that by bringing more people onto the pay roll. By the end, there were thousands of people on the pay roll who had no actual jobs. After unity, both parties tried to use their patronage power to expand their political base. Also, Yemen’s position on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait cost the country billions of dollars in lost remittances, foreign aid, and cost of services to be provided to hundreds of thousands of Yemenis who were expelled from Saudi Arabia.

This economic crisis led to discontent especially among Yemenis. In December 1992, riots broke out in major cities and left more than a hundred people dead. (Watkins Feb 7, 1994). On January 5, 1994 thousands of Yemenis took to the streets of the capital Sana’a and the city of the Taiz in protest of high prices and a sharp drop in the value of the Yemeni Riyal (The Independent Jan. 6, 1994). For Southern Yemenis who had experienced relative economic stability under the YSP, the hardening of the economic conditions was linked to unity and to corruption. The nostalgia for the past was evident in the voting patterns in southern Yemeni provinces where the YSP won most to the seats in Aprils 1993 elections.

Eighth, the economy collapsed in the early 1990s. Yemen’s position on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was ambiguous and was perceived by the Saudis as supportive of Iraq. To punish the Yemen leadership, Saudi Arabia suspended rights and privileges that were given to Yemeni immigrants. By doing so, the residency of hundreds of thousands of Yemenis in Saudi Arabia was suspended and they had to leave the country. This deprived Yemen of billions of dollars in remittances. Regional and international aid to Yemen was also suspended.

Section B. US Policy during the Civil War

In the aftermath of 1990-1991 wars in which Yemen’s position was perceived to be supportive of Iraq, the US government punished Yemen by withdrawing foreign aid. However, unlike other countries in the region, the US started once again making some overtures to Yemen. This happened due to several reasons. For one, as it appears, some American officials within the Clinton Administration were sympathetic towards democracy in Yemen. After all, President Clinton himself waged his campaign using the promotion of democracy worldwide as one of his foreign policy principles. One however, need not overemphasize the US support for democracy in Yemen because immediately after Yemen’s first elections (certified by international observers as relatively free and fair), the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Mack, in a visit in May 1993 to congratulate Yemenis, used the occasion to caution Yemenis of exporting their democracy to neighboring countries. “I do not think you should look on what you do here as a model for anyone else to follow” (Carapico 1993).

For another, “Yemen [was] working diligently since 1991 to explain itself to Washington and to repair its tattered relations with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait” (Hudson 1997: 170). In addition, American oil companies operating in Yemen worked hard to improve Washington’s relations with Sana’a.

Because of these factors, Washington moved gradually towards restoring relations with Yemen. In 1992, for example YSP’s General Secretary and Vice President of the ROY visited Washington and met with Clinton’s Vice President Al Gore. In the stage preceding the 1993 elections, the US based National Democratic Institute--an organization heavily supported by the US government—took part in the preparation for elections. In the aftermath of the elections, the US embassy in Sana’a issued a communique on April 27 (before the results were announced) congratulating Yemenis on their first multi-party elections (Kostiner 1996: 55).

The US policy at the time of the crisis was both against secession and against war because of its potential spill- over to neighboring countries. In August 29, 1993, the US ambassador in Sana’a felt that the YSP leadership was contemplating secession, and as a result asked Mr. al-baid to stick to unity even under a federal system (Mounser 2002: 228). After that, Robert Pelletreau-Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East visited Sana’a and Aden and delivered letters from the American Administration to President Saleh and Vice President al- baid containing strong warnings against war and a demand for a peaceful solution to end the political crisis (Ibid: 228). Upon his return to Washington, Pelletreau declared that the US supported Yemeni unity, political and economic reform and democratization.

Before the break-out of the civil war, the US government along with Oman and Jordan participated in a joint north-South military committee charged with de-escalation of the conflict between parties to Yemeni unity (Hudson 1997: 170). Meanwhile, both parties to the conflict tried (before and after the brake-out of war) to win Washington to their sides. The YSP used the rise of the Islamic oriented Islah and its relations with the GPC to caution the Americans from supporting the GPC. In a visit to Washington paid by Prime Minister Haidar Abu Bakr²⁵ al-Attas he “warned his American hosts that if Saleh wins control over all of Yemen, he intends to use the country as a base for training and exporting Islamic fundamentalist agitators and terrorists to other parts of the Middle East.” (Boustany, May17, 1994). Likewise, the GPC used the YSP’s past to warn the Americans of the consequences of any support to the YSP (al-Mouda’a 2002: 383)

Like the events of the 1960s, the US government found itself once again facing the challenge of balancing its policy towards Saudi Arabia, on the one hand, and policy towards Yemen on the other. The Saudi policy towards the Yemeni crisis can be summarized as supportive of secession.²⁶ The Saudi position was shaped by several factors. Historically, the Saudis had maintained a policy of divide and rule. As such, the Saudis had viewed the existence of a divided Yemen as an important assurance of their national security. Also, because the Saudis had a border dispute with Yemen, the Saudis wanted to negotiate final settlement with two weak Yemeni states instead of a strong united one. In addition, the Yemeni position on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait confirmed the Saudi suspicion that a united Yemen would challenge the hegemonic role of the Saudis. For all these reasons, the Saudis (and the Kuwaitis as well) covertly supported the secession financially and to some extent politically. When the YSP leadership declared secession on May 21, 1994, the Saudis actively moved regionally and internationally in support of the break-away state (al-Mouda’a 2002: 377). Their goal was to get the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to issue a resolution that would call for a halt of hostilities and as such indirectly legitimize the secession (Ibid: 377). The Saudi efforts paid off on June 1^st, 1994 when the UNSC adopted resolution 924 which:

1. Calls for an immediate cease- fire; 2. Urges an immediate cessation of the supply of arms and other material which might contribute to the continuation of the conflict; 3. Reminds all concerned that their political differences cannot be resolved through the use of force and urges them to return immediately to negotiations which will permit a peaceful resolution of their differences and a restoration of peace and stability; 4. Requests the Secretary-General to send a fact-finding mission to the area as soon as practicable to assess prospects for a renewed dialogue among all those concerned and for further efforts by them to resolve their differences; 5. Requests the Secretary-General to report to it on the situation at an appropriate time, but not later than one week after the completion of the fact-finding mission; 6. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. (UNSC June 1^st, 1994).

The northern Yemeni leadership interpreted a cease-fire as a de facto recognition of the breakaway republic, but at the same time they did not outrightly reject the resolution. As a result, they continued their offense and advancement towards Aden. Once again and because of the intensive lobbying by Prince Bandar Bin Sultan—the Saudi ambassador to Washington, the UNSC issued a second resolution (resolution 931) on June 29, 1994 concerning the situation in Yemen. In resolution 931, strong language was used against the northern forces. The resolution for example called for an immediate cease-fire and a halt of attacks on the city of Aden the capital of the newly created republic. The northern forces, however, were able to bring the war to an end a few days later with the city of Aden falling in the hands of the northern forces and the southern leadership fleeing the country.

American policy makers were, at the time of the Yemeni Civil War, concerned about the stability in the region. A protracted Yemeni Civil War would have ultimately led to instability in neighboring countries. So the number one goal was to stop the war. This was evident in their support of the UNSC resolutions 924 and 931. This position differed from the Saudi and southern Yemenis’ position in that the Saudis and the southern Yemenis wanted an end to the war in secession. It also differed from the position of the northern Yemenis who wanted the war to end in victory the northern forces and continuation of unity. From the circumstance, one can infer that American policy makers were neither strongly in favor of unity nor strongly in favor of secession. They were strongly against war and they were willing to go along with whomever brought the war to an end. The American concern for stability, however, meant opposing any steps to prolonging the war. Towards this end, they opposed the attempts by the Saudis to recognize the break-away republic. They also called on other countries to refrain from arming the two sides. In the American view, a protracted Yemeni war may invite other countries in the region such as Iran, Sudan, and Libya (whom the US viewed as radical) to intervene ((Boustany Jan 128, 1994).

Meanwhile, American policymakers—with strong connections to Saudi Arabia—did not want the Saudis to feel humiliated. According to Yemen’s Foreign Minister at the time, Dr. Abdul Karim al-Iryani, the Americans asked President Saleh not to enter Aden and they considered it a red line for the northern forces. When they did enter Aden and declared victory, the Americans had no problem with that (J.K.C.S, 2001: 31).

Conclusion

One of the major crises, which faced the Yemeni unity just three months after its inception, was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The exact position that Yemen took during the crisis is hard to pin down. However, for Yemen's neighbors--excluding Qatar--and for the US, Yemen's position was pro Iraq and against Kuwait and other Gulf countries. To punish Yemen, hundreds of thousands of Yemenis were expelled from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, and the US withdrew its foreign aid. As a result, Yemen found itself in economic turmoil. At the same time, the relations between the GPC and the YSP were deteriorating with the animosity of the past resurfacing in the newly created state. The results of the April 1993 elections contributed to the problem because it led to a redistribution of power within the country that was not acceptable to the YSP. All these factors, along with the Saudi and Kuwaiti support for secession in Yemen, led the country into a full-scale civil war in April 1994. While the Gulf countries--excluding Qatar-- sympathized with the YSP, the US government favored an immediate end to civil war. Since supporting secession would only prolong the civil war, the US government pushed half-heartedly towards protecting the Yemeni unity. The end result was the preservation of Yemeni unity.

VI. US-Yemen Relations Since the End of the Yemeni Civil War of 1994

Introduction

This chapter explores into US-Yemen relations since the end of the Yemeni 1994 Civil War. It argues that this period witnessed a greater intensity of interaction between the two countries due to the uncertainties the US faced in its relations with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, especially after the attacks on Americans in Saudi Arabia on November 15, 1995 and on June 25, 1996. During most of the 1990s the two countries found themselves forced to work together to achieve certain goals vital to their interests including fighting the common enemy--terrorism.

The chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section, the relations between the two countries between 1995 and 2000 are analyzed. The second section traces the historical roots of terrorism in Yemen. In the third section, the USS-Cole attack is discussed. The final section addresses Yemen’s response to the events of September 11 and the impact of the horrific event on relations between the two countries.

Section A. The Post War Relations 1995-2000

Despite the setback in US-Yemen relations in the early 1990s (derived largely from Yemen’s position on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and on the Arab-Israeli conflict, the relations between the two countries continued to grow after the end of the Civil War. Yemen’s interest in courting the US revolved around economic interests. The Yemenis wanted the Clinton Administration to support Yemen’s economic growth directly by providing loans and grants and indirectly by propping Yemen’s position in international organizations (especially in the IMF and World Bank). The US both directly and indirectly pressured the Yemeni government to follow through with the IMF and World Bank suggested reforms, for these reforms represented the American economic view for the world of the 1990s. However, in terms of foreign aid (both loans and grants), the amount given was minimal (Prados November 20, 2000). The ROY benefit from several programs such as food and export credit guarantees, the demeaning operations, and also from the activities of non-governmental organizations (Ibid.) such as the National Democratic Institute NDI—an institution concerned with the development of democratic institutions. For example, in 1999 and 2000, the ROY received donations of 110,000 and 177, 000 metric tons of rice, wheat flour, and soybean meal, respectively (Ibid). The major backing for Yemen’s economic reforms was granted in May 1998 when Yemen’s creditors in the Paris Club met to discuss Yemen’s debt. The US decided to forgive sixty percent of Yemen’s debt and agreed to reschedule the rest of Yemen’s debt ($27 million) for a period of thirty years (Thabt, June 14, 2001).

Yemen, feeling threatened by its conservative neighbors, wanted the US to support democracy building in Yemen. The US position on democracy in Yemen was more ambiguous. Support to Yemen’s democratic development was more symbolic than real. For one, the NDI—a non-profit organization largely funded by the American government--continued its election related activities in Yemen. For another, in 2000 $1.5 million was made available to non-governmental organizations working on democracy building in Yemen (Prados, November 20, 2000).

The American goals in Yemen in a descending order included military concessions, normalization with Israel, and the fight against terrorism. American military interests in Yemen started in the mid-1990s. As Prado states:

“Yemen has assumed increasing importance in U.S. strategic planning, as the United States faces a continuing requirement to maintain forces in the Persian Gulf region and expand command and logistics facilities in the area. At present, approximately 25,000 U.S. military personnel are deployed in the Persian Gulf region where they conduct overflights of Iraqi territory, interdict the flow of banned goods into or out of Iraq by boat, and help deter threats from Iraq (or possibly Iran) against Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, or other key U. S. allies. U. S. ties to Yemen, which lies athwart important waterways en route to the Persian Gulf, are designed to facilitate these missions, to support local counter-terrorist efforts, and to contribute toward stability in the oil-rich Arabian Peninsula.”

What made the US more interested in Yemen in the last half of the 1990s were changes in the US Saudi relations. With the growing discontent within Saudi Arabia and the desire of the Saudi family to distance itself from Americans, there was a feeling in Washington that Yemen, with its borders problem with Saudi Arabia could serve an important American interest. “The issue of Saudi stability has been factored into Washington’s strategic thinking for several years” (Sciolino November 4, 2001) even before the events of September 11^th. The American concern with the stability of Saudi Arabia dramatically increased after the terrorist attack on the “Khobar military barracks in Saudi Arabia in 1996,” that killed 19 Americans. The Americans feared that Saudi Arabia—a close ally of the United States—might be lost in a similar fashion as Iran was lost to the Islamists in 1979 (Ibid). The rise of Crown Prince Abdullah—“regarded as a pious, incorruptible leader more responsive to the people and more willing than his predecessor, King Fahd, to take on Washington”-- to power after deterioration in King Fahd's health set off an alarm in Washington (Ibid).

The Yemenis welcomed the American interest and tried to use it to pressure the Saudis towards solving the border disputes between the two countries. As a result, bilateral military activities increased after 1995. This was evident in the increase of the number of visits by Senior U. S. military officers. It was also evident in the joint training exercises conducted by the two countries and in the US participation in the establishment of a coast guard to help Yemen protects its borders. In addition, “Since 1997, U.S. special forces teams have trained 270 Yemeni Army personnel in de-mining operations” (Prados, November 20 2000).

The US military also showed a greater interest in using the port of Aden because of its strategic location "at the crossroads of the Red Sea and Arabian Sea,” and because it “is one of the world's largest natural harbors.” “The convenience of Aden, increasing political or logistical problems at other nearby ports, and a desire to deepen defense relationships with Yemen, led U.S. officials to seek refueling privileges in Aden for ships en route to the Persian Gulf. In 1998, Yemen agreed to provide bunkering in Aden for 600, 000 barrels of oil to support U.S. naval operations in the region” (Ibid).

In terms of normalization with Israel, the US used its economic support for Yemen as leverage to push Yemen to establish relations with the Jewish state. However, because Yemen (unlike for example Jordan and Egypt) was not a frontier state, the US government did not press Yemen as much, nor did it offer generous rewards for Yemen’s subsequent moves. As a step in this direction, the ROY in December 1997 partook, along with other Arab countries, in a conference hosted by Qatar, the purpose of which was to discuss economic normalization with Israel. This event was highly controversial because it was boycotted by US’s major allies in the Arab World, namely Egypt and Saudi Arabia (Fisk November 14, 1997). Furthermore, the Yemeni government under the pressure from the US started in early 2000 allowing Jews of Yemeni decent to visit Yemen. Although members of the group were carrying British and American passports, the visit attracted media attentions and served as an embarrassment for the Yemeni government.

It also continued its policy of letting the Yemeni Jews leave Yemen if they chose to do so (Gleit, March 30, 2000).

Table 6.1: Major Terrorist Attacks against American Targets since the End of the Gulf War (1990-1991)²⁷

Terrorism became a concern for the US in its relations with Yemen, especially after the occurrence of attacks against American targets since the end of the Gulf War (see Figure 5.1). However, as we will see, terrorism did not become the number one item on US agenda in Yemen until the attack on the USS-Cole, which is discussed in Section III of this chapter.

Current Yemeni President Abdullah Saleh received support from President Clinton on his 1999 Presidential victory. He was also commended for his democratic views despite talks of his election being a sham.

Section B. Terrorism in Yemen

The Yemeni connection started in the 1970s when the Saudis, in coordination with their security guarantor, the United States decided to wage their war on Communism using political Islam. With South Yemen becoming the only Communist country in the Arab World and with the threat it represented to the Saudi royal family and other monarchies in the Peninsula, Yemen was selected as a battleground in the fight against the evil empire. Throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, thousands of schools were created across Yemen to recruit and nurture a generation of young Yemenis who were as puritanical as the Saudis and Americans wanted them to be. In an impoverished country like Yemen, Islamism became a profession, a career, and the only way to gain access to education and livelihood. During the 1980s many Yemenis, with Saudi sponsorship, went to Afghanistan to join the jihad against the Soviets. Within Yemen itself some top army officers and members of the ruling class became involved in the process of recruiting and preparing the Mujaheedin. As long as wealthy Saudis and leaders of Jihad like Osama Bin Laden were paying the bills, Jihad became a profitable trade for some Yemenis.²⁸

By the late 1990s, Yemen had had more Jihadis than there were battles for Jihad and many of those Jihadis turned towards their own country to liberate it from the infidel Yemenis!! There are numerous stories of children in those Saudi sponsored madras as who turned against their own parents, friends, and relatives and accused them of being infidels. The veiling of women, which was common only in urban centers, became a countrywide phenomenon and women failing to veil were subject to harassment and intimidation. Islamism, especially after the defeat of the leftist opposition to the regime in the north, became one of the pillars of the political order with some relatives of the president coordinating the Jihad efforts against the regime opponents. This was evident after Yemen unity when a wave of terror targeted the leadership of the Yemeni Social Party and led to the 1994 civil war.

When the Jihad ended in Afghanistan by the late 1980s, many Afghanis (Yemenis and non-Yemenis) returned to the country and were incorporated into civil and military institutions, especially the educational sector. Unlike other countries, where the Arab Afghans faced detentions, prosecutions, and deportations, the Arab Afghans were welcomed in Yemen. The main reasons for Yemen’s behavior are Yemen’s unity and the adoption of democracy. These two factors made Yemen very open and inevitably weakened political institutions and created conflicting interests within the system.

Some of those returnees pursued a normal life; others had a radical agenda. Those belonging to the second group perused a wave of terror that targeted members of the YSP, American and British targets. As Figure 5.1 illustrates, one of the early activities of this group was the attack on two hotels in the city of Aden on December 29, 1992. The target of the attack was a group of a hundred American soldiers serving as a backup base for their operation in Somalia. It was reported that those individuals—who were never captured—were acting in response to a fatwa issued by Osama Bin Laden (Leupp, May 2002).

In the 1994 Civil War, the Yemeni (and some alleged the Arab) Afghans played an important role in sustaining unity after the South attempted secession by siding with the northern faction (Smucker and LaFranchi December 31, 2002). It was immediately after this war that the regime started a revisionist policy towards these groups and towards Islamists in general.

Starting in mid-1997, the Yemeni government started a major operation of deportation of suspected Arab and foreign Islamists residing in Yemen. In this exodus, more than 15,000 Islamists were expelled from the country (Thabt June 14, 2001). This was partially in response to pressure exerted by the US government and partially out of the fear that those elements represented a threat to the regime.

Section C. The USS-Cole Attack

On October 12, 2000, suspected alQaeda
suicide squad piloted a boat laden with explosives into the destroyer--the USS Cole (Radwan, September 30, 2002: 8).
The incident left 17 American sailors dead and 39 wounded. The incident caused an uproar both in the US and in Yemen. At the onset, tension rose between the two countries immediately after the incident. This was caused by the hasty explanation offered by the Yemeni government, which attributed the incident to a fire. President Saleh initially denied that the attack was carried out by terrorists and he suggested that the attack occurred inside (not outside the ship).

In subsequent weeks and months, a chain of crises in US-Yemen relations ensued. An interview in the Washington Post on December 10, 2000 with President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen illustrates the issues of contention between the two sides. The following section in particular highlights the difficulties involved:

-Can you talk about the agreement on the investigation guidelines that you

signed [Nov. 29] with Washington? Do they allow the FBI to interview suspects?

- The agreement we signed organizes the cooperation between the U.S. and Yemeni

investigators and gives the U.S. investigators greater access to information.

- Can American investigators sit in on the interrogations of suspects and pass

questions to your investigators?

-Yes, [the American] investigators can pass questions to the Yemeni

investigators, who will ask the questions for them.

-Will the U.S. investigators be able to sit in the same room as the suspects

and the Yemeni investigators?

-Yes, they can sit with the Yemeni investigators, but not alone with a Yemeni

suspect.

- The United States wants to put on trial the people responsible for the attack

on the Cole, but Yemeni law says suspects cannot be extradited. Will you let

suspects go to the United States?

-[Extradition of suspects] is not allowed under our constitution.

-What about witnesses who are necessary to build a case against terrorists?

- This depends on Yemeni law. A trial will be held here in Yemen in January and

we will adopt all constitutional and legal measures.

-There have been reports that people high up in your government were involved

in the bombing of the Cole--that such an operation couldn't have been done

without high-level help.

-These are weak stories aimed to create trouble with the U.S. side.

-To destroy the U.S.-Yemeni relationship?

-They write about this as if it were a play. One opposition newspaper . . .

even claimed my son was involved.

-Has the attack on the USS Cole set back U.S.-Yemeni relations?

-No.

-Do you have any problem with the FBI being in your country? Have you and they

been sharing information?

-They are being treated as guests and given all facilities.

-There were stories after the bombing of the Cole in the Yemeni press that

there had been a landing of U.S. tanks after the attack.

-Actually there were two armored vehicles, which were brought to Aden and then

taken back to the ship . . . .

-You told them to get them out of Aden?

-We told them to take them back to the ships.

-Did you tell the FBI to go back to the ships, too?

-We worked with them, [but] we had problems with the number of Marines at the

hotel in Aden and we told them to go back to the ship, leaving only a few on

shore. (Washington Post December 10, 2000).

First, the Yemeni government, under pressure from opposition groups and fearing American intrusion, refused to allow FBI agents' access to suspects. This was partially resolved when the two sides signed an agreement on November 29, 2000 that gave American investigators the opportunity to attend and submit written questions to suspects.

Second, the US wanted to extradite suspects in the attack on the USS-Cole but the Yemeni government refused citing a prohibition stipulated by article 44 of the Yemeni 1994 Constitution, which states that “A Yemeni national may not be extradited to a foreign authority.” Besides the president, Yemen's then Prime Minister (and close ally of Washington) Dr. Abdul Karim al-Iryani told Newsweek that the issue of extradition was "political dynamite" (Newsweek December 18, 2000). He said, "may be it is easier to punish them in Yemen than in the United States." (Ibid.) It is worth noting that 13 of the suspected 17 terrorists were Yemenis and the other three were Saudis of Yemeni decent.

Third, American investigators sought to expand the investigation to include high-ranking officials in the Yemeni government. The American side feared that the Yemeni investigators might conclude finish up the case before solid evidence was had been gathered. It appears also that Americans wanted to collect as much data as they could about possible organizations and persons in Yemen suspected of terrorism. The Yemeni side fiercely opposed such intrusive and unnecessary steps. It sought to limit the investigation to the incident itself. Related to this was the issue of whether to expedite the investigation and send the suspects to court (a preference for the Yemeni side) or to postpone trial and focus on collecting information. In the end, the Yemenis submitted in to the American demand to delay the transfer of the case to court.

Fourth, the Yemeni government also felt uneasy with the American presence in the city of Aden. Frequently, it asked them to retreat to the ships or to leave the city citing security concerns and certain sensitivities.

Fifth, while American investigators were determined to link the incident to Bin Laden, the Yemeni officials were cautious in their conclusions. They did not want the incident to be used to justify an attack on a Muslim country similar to that the US carried out in 1998 targeting of Sudan and Afghanistan. As it turned out, the target of the attack on Sudan turned to be a pharmaceutical factory and not a chemical plant. However, Yemeni officials, from time to time, made references to Bin Laden. For example, Yemen's then Interior Minister Hussein Arab stated: "We think the Cole terrorists have strong links with Afghanistan and we can say, yes, there are links with Bin Laden" (Newsweek December 18, 2000).

Overall, US-Yemen relations fluctuated during the investigation between steady but limited cooperation and short episodes of discord. At times, Yemen was calling the US investigative tactics intrusive and the US was calling Yemen uncooperative (APS August 26, 2002: 2).

The road wasn’t always smooth leading up to the September 11 attacks but it wasn’t always rocky, either. Contrary to what one may expect, the attack on the USS-Cole appears to have strengthened (and not weakened) US-Yemen relations. Not only had it brought Yemen under the American radar but it also helped Yemen's leadership move aggressively to consolidate relations with Washington.

Section D. Yemen's Response to September 11

While the Yemeni government enjoyed a great deal of leeway to maneuver in its dealing with American investigators before September 11, it lacked that after the horrific events. Looking back at the most recent history, the Yemeni leadership realized that neither its position on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, nor its handling of the investigation into the USS-Cole incident, met the US expectations. Yemen's President Ali Abdullah Saleh symbolized this when he acknowledged that Yemen paid a heavy price for its verbal support of Iraq in the Gulf War and that he was not going to make the same mistake again (The Economist February 16, 2002). Equally significant has been the political scene in Yemen itself.

For Americans, Yemen became a concern for the recent Bush administration for many reasons. First, Yemen is the ancestral land of America's number one enemy, Osama Bin Laden, and US officials suspected and continue to suspect that Bin Laden may move to Yemen. Second, Yemen's central government lacks effective control over vast regions in the country especially to the North and northeast (Sachs Feb 6, 2002). In these regions, tribal chiefs, who are suspected of sympathizing with Bin Laden have more power than the central government. Third, as early as October 2001, a U. S official described Yemen as having one of "the most significant" links to alQaeda, "composed of mostly Yemenis who received military training in Afghanistan”(CNN December 18, 2001). Diplomatic sources in Yemen told CNN that, "thousands of veterans of the Soviet-Afghan war are living in Yemen and were capable of launching 'uncoordinated or coordinated attacks.'"(CNN December 18, 2001). The number of Yemenis joining the Jihad in Afghanistan is hard to pin down, but experts put the number somewhere between four and forty thousand (The Economist February 16, 2002). For Americans, the Afghanisation of Yemen was a grim prospect.

The Yemeni government, in response to American concerns, acknowledges that, thousands of the so-called "Arab Afghans," live in the country. It stated, however, that it was carefully monitoring those returnees, that most of those Arab Afghans have been leading peaceful live in the country, and that it had since 1998 deported about five thousand non-Yemenis--including the "Arab Afghans" (CNN December 18, 2001). Yemen had started the deportation of Arab Afghans in 1998 to achieve two goals: appease the United States and other regional actors--in particular, Egypt-- and minimize the risks those Afghan Arabs presented to the country's political stability. Those Afghan Arabs were viewed as socializing Yemenis into the opposition Islamic oriented party--Islah.

On the question of the government's ability to expand the power of the central government to lawless regions, the Yemeni government repeatedly asked Americans for support. A key demand was for American help in building and equipping the Yemeni coastguard so that it could prevent infiltration by alQaeda
elements of the Yemeni territory. It was reported that General Tommy Franks, during a visit to Sana'a in October 2002, confirmed Washington's commitment to help Yemen protect its coast by providing a number of boats and training the needed Yemeni individuals (Garbany Oct. 18, 2002).

In the aftermath of September 11, the Bush Administration put Yemen under the microscope and from time to time, there ware signals sent through the media and diplomatic channels that Yemen could become the next target in America's war against terrorism. The Yemeni government did not miss the signal and it acted in several ways to assure Americans that it was committed to the cause. Towards this end, the Yemeni government condemned strongly the terrorist attacks; carried out a swift wave of arrests among the Arab Afghans; tightened the rope on the neck of its Islamist opponents; tried to expand state power and control to remote areas, and allowed Americans to carry out covert operations inside the country.

Letters and Statements

In response to September 11, the Yemeni government released three separate correspondences. The first statement, issued on September 11, declared: "The Leadership, Government, and People of Yemen condemn and oppose strongly such vicious and terrorist acts.”
(Yemen Embassy September 11, 2001). The second correspondence was a letter sent on September 12, from Yemen's Foreign Minister, Dr. al-Qarbi, to US Secretary of State Colin Powell. In the letter, the Yemeni official wrote: “Our condemnation goes to all forms of terrorism which challenges our common vision towards peace and stability throughout the world”
(Yemen Embassy September 12, 2001). The third correspondence was a letter of condolence from President Saleh to President George W. Bush. In the letter, Saleh reiterated Yemen's position adding that, “such acts should not retract our efforts to curb and resist the perpetrators whoever they may be” (Yemen Embassy September 11, 2001).

Campaigns of Arrests

Following September 11, the Yemeni government, under pressure from the US, and based on intelligence provided to it, carried out a massive campaign of arrests among the so-called "Arab Afghans." Those who were not Yemeni nationals were deported from the country and Yemenis were kept in jails. The government also warned clerics in mosques of the danger of terrorism and its devastating impact on the economy. However, the US government was pressing for the arrest of specific persons. When President Saleh of Yemen visited Washington on November 27, 2001 (not long after the events of September 11, President Bush told him that the future of relations between the two countries (and the two leaders) will depend very much on Yemen's cooperation in the war against terrorism (Tyler December 19, 2002). Also, President Bush made it clear that the Yemeni government should without delay capture two of the most wanted alQaeda
operatives in Yemen (Qaed Sinan al-Harethi and Mohammad Ahmed al-Ahdel) and if it cannot, the US government would send its own troops (Ibid). Those individuals had been linked to the attack on the USS-Cole in October 2000.

Targeting Islah

The terrorist attacks on the US coincided with a growing discord among political forces in Yemen. The ruling party--the General's People Congress (GPC)--was facing a growing challenge for its domination of power by the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (known also by its Arabic short hand Islah, the Arabic word for reform). With Islah

leading a coalition of opposition parties, the GPC leadership found itself in a defensive opposition while preparing for the upcoming elections of 2003. The events of September 11, presented Yemen with a dichotomy. All opposition parties on the left and the right outrightly rejected siding with the US in the war against terrorism. At the same time, failing to cooperate with the US would undermine Yemen's ruling party and make it more vulnerable to electoral defeat in 2003 elections.

Faced with this dilemma, the Yemeni government chose to side with the Americans and tried and continues to try cracking down on its Islamists. Those who followed the political evolution of Yemen since 1995 would see a deterioration of relations between and the Yemeni Congregation for Reform, Islah. "The possibility of such cooperation precludes any chance that Islamists would come to power in Yemen in the foreseeable future." (APS Diplomat June 17, 2000). This is also true for other parties including the Yemeni Socialist Party and the nationalist and pan-Arabist groups.

Expanding State Power

One of Yemen's illnesses is the stigma of lawlessness, which has been noted repeatedly in the Western media. This lawlessness emanates from the weakness of the central government and its inability to expand control to all areas, especially those in the North and northeast, which have become hotbeds for lawlessness, and allegedly very attractive to alQaeda remnants. Expanding state power over Yemen has been problematic. Although the US (through the CIA) appeared to have channeled emergency aid to Yemen to deal with terrorism and train its anti-terrorism forces, reports surface in the West that this funding might be misused. A case in point was the discovery of a North Korean shipment of Scud missiles while en route to Yemen on December 2002. As it turned out Yemen claimed ownership of these missiles promoting an uproar in some Western circles. William Safire of the New York Times wrote on December 20:

"U.S. officials were thunderstruck. Had Saleh not solemnly assured us 18 months ago, when we purchased his support in the war on terror, that he would no longer buy Scuds from NorthKorea? His disputes with the Saudis and Eritreans were long since resolved; the only logical explanation was that he planned to re-sell the secret shipment at a whopping profit to a nation or group that did not wish us well."

While it is not clear if the US paid Saleh to purchase his support as the author alleges, the missile crisis appeared to have provoked a great number of questions but offered no answers. Did the CIA offer money to the Yemeni side? If yes, how much? The CNN reported that the US had promised about 150 million dollars to pay for security upgrades in Yemen (CNN November 27, 2001). In this direction, the US government also pressed Yemen to accept the presence of Anti-terrorism experts in the country to train Yemeni forces in counter terrorism, and provide advice and assistance when needed (CNN February 15, 2002).

This move was very controversial in the light of public resentment of American policy and the public rejection of a American military presence. Opposition parties with the Islamists at the forefront have been trying to use this to mobilize people against the government.

American Covert Operations

On November 3, 2003, a CIA operated unmanned spy plane sent a Hellfire missile targeting a car occupied by six suspected alQaeda
operatives in the province of Marib--including Quaed Salim Sinan al-Harthi whom Americans suspected of being the brain behind the attack on USS-Cole on 12 October 2000 (Andrew
December 20, 2002). The initial explanation offered by the Yemeni government was that the car full of weapons exploded for no clear reasons. Contrary to the Yemeni claim, the American government (just a few days before the November six mid-term elections) quickly took credit for the attack. Under mounting criticism from opposition parties of the Yemeni government's silence, the Yemeni government two weeks later released a statement in which it admitted that: "This operation was carried out ... as part of security coordination and cooperation between Yemen

and the United States." (Los Angles Times November 20, 2002).

This operation caused embarrassment for the Yemeni government and one of the difficult questions concerns the issue of whether the Yemeni government knew about this operation or if it was surprised just like everyone else. Whatever the situation is, the Yemeni government has said openly that it knew about it and it was part of joint cooperation to combat terrorism. Not only that but Dr. Iryani who is a political advisor to the president stated during an interview with Fox news during a visit to Washington that his country would not hesitate in cooperating with the US in the fight against terrorism even if that entails allowing Americans to carry out other covert operations against alQaeda
operatives in Yemen (Boustany November 27, 2002).

Threats of Discord

While US-Yemen relations witnessed improvement after the attack on USS-Cole and again after the events of September 11, the threat of discord is still present. For one, the Yemeni government still does not see eye to eye with the American government in the question of Iraq. Although the US government does not mind whatever position Yemen takes, this might become an issue if things go wrong in the upcoming weeks and months. For another, the US government continued to insist on investigating certain Yemeni individuals and has gone as far as trying to drag some Yemenis to other countries only to get them arrested. A case in point is the case of clerk Sheik Muhammad Ali Hassan al-Mouyad--a Yemeni cleric and philanthropist--who was lured by an under cover FBI agent to Germany (Lichblau and Glaberson March 5, 2003). The US government is accusing al-Mouyad of sponsoring terrorism but the Yemeni government is denying any link between al-Mouyad and terrorist groups. Whether al-Mouyad's case or any other would develop into a crisis between the two countries is anyone's guess. It is worth noting, however, that the two countries have overcome many obstacles in the past few years including those emanating from the investigation into the USS-Cole and the September 11 attacks.

Conclusion

US Yemen relations in the last half of the 1990s and up to the early years of the new decade developed rapidly. This was partially due to the changing regional environment that forced the US to seek new allies, fearing that old allies were less dependable regimes, and also because of the rise of terrorism. As one of the countries with the potential of becoming a hotbed for terrorist groups, the US has moved to strengthen ties with Yemen in the hope of preventing it from becoming another Afghanistan. At the same time, the Yemeni leadership is seizing the moment to foster good relations with the US so that it can increase its political stock internally and internationally. As it now appears, the war against terrorism serves a common goal for both the Yemeni government, which seeks to expand its control on its vast lawless regions, and the US government, which seeks to suppress radical groups and movements and prevent them from gaining a foothold in Yemen.

VII: Conclusions

This study has examined US-Yemen relations during four historical turning points: 1- the unification of Yemen in 1990; 2- the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and; 3- Yemen's civil war in 1994; and 4-the US fight against terrorism. The examination of these crises reveals the main dimensions of US-Yemen relations during the 1990s up to the American invasion of Iraq. This case study provides evidence for the realist approach, which explains countries’ behavior in terms of their primary concerns for power and for advancing their national interests.

First, up to the mid 1990s, US policy towards Yemen appeared to be a continuation of its previous policy towards the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). While the US government recognized the unification of the two Yemens (the YAR and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen--the PDRY), it continued to appease the Saudis in terms of keeping a low profile in Yemen and allowing them the upper hand in handling the Yemeni question. This served US interests in two ways. First, the US avoided the economic costs of inserting itself into the complexities of Yemen. Second, the US delegated the containment of the communist regime in South Yemen to the Saudis. However, when US interests were better served by direct intervention, the US government took the lead in initiating a new policy.

The US recognition of the Republic of Yemen (ROY), which was created on May 22, 1990, occurred during the Kennedy Administration. US policy went against the wishes of the Saudis because it was contrary to Saudi interests. American policy, concerned about the Saudi regime, was also concerned about larger questions such as the consolidation of its position as the region superpower.

On December 18, 1962, the Kennedy Administration recognized the newly created YAR out of fear that failure to recognize the new regime would give the Soviets a footstep in the Arabian Peninsula, and threaten US interests. The Kennedy administration also wanted to present itself as a supporter of independence movements in the Third World in a way that would undermine the Soviets. The US government also consented to the creation of a united Yemen in the context of a global shift towards democracy and the triumph of capitalism over communism.

The US government viewed the unification of Yemen as an important development in the consolidation of capitalism and assuring the demise of the communist- oriented regime in the PDRY listed by the US Department of State as a sponsor of terrorism. At the same time, the US government made sure that a unified Yemen would not represent a threat to its neighbors. This occurred through a visit made by President Saleh (of the YAR) to Washington D. C. in January 1990--just four months before the declaration of the new unified state. In terms of ideals and principles, the US recognition of the ROY was also motivated by the realization that Yemeni unity was very popular among the Yemeni people and it would have been a mistake to go against their wishes.

Second, the US recognition of the ROY did not mark a departure in US foreign policy towards Yemen. The US continued to ignore Yemeni overtures during the first half of the 1990s, just as it had throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. Even when the Yemenis tried hard to present themselves as champions of democracy, the US response was to warn the ROY not to attempt to export their socialist experiment to neighboring countries.

Third, Yemen's position on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait alarmed both the US and its neighbors. While Yemen claimed to have taken a neutral position in the conflict, its voting patterns on United Nations Security Council resolutions concerning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait prompted a retaliatory action from the US as well as from Yemen's neighbors. The US government cut off foreign aid to Yemen. The Saudi response was harsher since they expelled hundreds of thousands of Yemeni workers. Yet, it was remarkable that the US underplayed the Yemeni position and soon resumed normal relations with the ROY.

Fourth, while the Saudi and the Kuwaiti governments supported the secession attempt by the leadership of the Yemeni Socialist Party in 1994, the US government viewed such a move as dangerous and destabilizing. The US government wanted a quick end to the civil war before it spread to neighboring countries. As a result, it resisted moves to prolong the war, which recognition of the secessionist state would have done. While the Americans were willing to recognize a two-state scenario, they had doubts about the viability of such an option.

Fifth, a major change in US-Yemen relations evolved in the second half of the 1990s. This change was largely caused by the Saudi factor. Yemen, having preserved its unity, was under tremendous pressure from the Saudis to agree to a border agreement that favored Saudi interests. Moreover, the Saudis provided sanctuary to southern Yemenis who fled in the aftermath of the Yemeni civil war and who were tied to the London- based Yemeni opposition. For the US, relations between the US and Saudi Arabia became strained in the latter half of the 1990s. The primary reason was the changes within Saudi Arabia itself. The American military presence in Saudi Arabia had eroded the legitimacy of the royal family, while prompting a reaction from radical movements
that sought to overthrow the monarchy and expel Americans from the Muslim Holy lands. These movements eventually resorted to the use of violence. Several attacks were carried out on American military interests in Saudi Arabia, including the attacks in November 1995 and in June 1996, which left 24 American soldiers dead.

The Saudi handling of the investigation into these incidents and its refusal to allow the US to join in the investigation raised serious questions about the real intentions the Saudi regime. American officials feared that the Saudi royal family might be overthrown by radical groups, just like the Shah in Iran.

For these reasons, the US government courted Yemen and exploited the rising tension between Yemen and Saudi Arabia. The US goal was to secure military concessions from the Yemeni government. The Yemeni government responded positively to the American overture. While it could not give the US a military base or any significant concessions, this nevertheless allowed a high level of interaction to occur. The Yemeni goal was two-fold: to deter the Saudi threat, and to obtain economic support.

Sixth, US-Yemen relations passed through a difficult stage after the attack on the USS Cole (on October 12, 2000). The handling of the investigation led to a series of mini-crises. The Americans wanted to be able to interrogate Yemeni detainees and if possible to extradite them to the US. They also wanted to investigate some Yemeni leaders who might have had useful information, but the Yemenis refused to extradite Yemeni citizens. However, both governments realized that cooperation (even if minimal) was better than discord. The net effect was to strengthen bilateral relations between the two countries, although neither side received what it had wanted.

Finally, the events of September 11,
2001 served as a catalyst in the consolidation of US-Yemeni relations. While the US government feared that Yemen might become another Afghanistan and a safe haven for alQaeda members to regroup and launch deadly attacks on US interests in the region, the US moved to pressure the Yemeni government to fully cooperate or else face American retaliation. At the same time, the Yemeni regime was facing growing domestic discontent because of a worsening economic situation. These conditions created a convergence of interests between the Bush Administration and the government of President Saleh, with both joining hands in the fight against terrorism. The Bush Administration wanted to preempt terrorist groups before they could strike again. President Saleh's government wanted to combat terrorism as well as undermine its opponents, especially the Islamists who stood to gain from reversals to Saleh's power. In addition, the Yemeni government found it beneficial to cooperate with the US because it stood to gain economically and militarily.

Bibliography:

Agence France Press. (January 21, 2002). “Yemen Puts Losses at 800 Million Dollars Since September 11.”

Al-faqih, Abdullah. (2003). From Liberalization and Democratization to Deliberalization and Dedemocratisation, Dissertation, Northeastern University.

Al-Haj, Ahmed. (November 4, 2002). “Bin Laden Aide Killed in Blast.” www.newsday.com.

Almadhagi, Ahmed. (1996). Yemen and the United States: A Study of a Small Power and Supper-state Relationship 1962-1994. London and New York: I.B.Tauris Publishers.

APS Diplomat Recorder. (October 21, 2000.) “Arab-US Relations,” 53(16).

APS Diplomat Recorder. (January 17, 2000).
“Strategic Balance in the Middle East: The Situation Of Yemen,” 39(3).

APS Diplomat Fate of the Arabian Peninsula. (August 26, 2002). “Yemen-Globalising Under the US Umbrella,” 43(2).

BBC NEWS. (October 16, 2002). “Yemen Says Tanker Blast was Terrorism.” News.bbc.co.uk.

Bonner, Raymond. (November 25, 2001). “Yemen, Long a Foe, Joins Anti-Terrorism Effort.” The New York Times.

Boustany, Nora. (May 18, 1994). “North’s Forces Gain Ground in Yemeni War; Southern Leader Seeks Help From Washington.” The Washington Post.

Boustany, Nora. (June 18, 1994). “Civil War in Yemen Worries of Wider Instability.” The Washington Post.

Boustany, Nora. (November 27, 2002). “Yemeni Proclaims His Nation's Solidarity With U.S. in Fight Against Terrorism.” The Washington Post.

Brooks, Stephen G. (Summer 1997).

“Dueling Realisms: Realism in International Relations.” International Organization.
51(3): 1-34.

Bronner, Ethan.
(July 25, 1992). “Experiment in Democracy in Arabia; Yemen, Snubbed by US and an Irritant to Saudis, Looks to Elections and a Brighter Future.” Boston Globe.

Cairo, Deborah Pugh. (January 20, 1994). “Yemen to Solve the Dilemma of Dual Armies.” The Christian Science Monitor.

CNN. (November 27, 2001). “Yemen-US Increase Antiterrorism Cooperation.” www.cnn.com.

CNN. (December 18, 2001). “Yemeni Forces Move on alQaeda.” www.cnn.com.

CNN. (February 15, 2002). “US-Yemen Discusses Deployment of US Forces.” www.cnn.com.

Dawn. (November 3, 2002). “Osama’s Wife Held in Yemen; Son Expelled from Iran.” www.Dawn.com.

Deutsche Presse-Agentur. (May 23, 2002). “Yemen Defends Its Cooperation on Terrorism with the US.”

Djerejian, Edward P. (March 1996). “United States Policy Toward Islam Arc of Crisis.” Middle East Policy,
4(3): 200-207.

Duke, Anthony John. (June 3, 2000). “Saudi Arabian-Yemeni Relations: Implications for U.S. Policy.” Middle East Policy,
pg. 78-96.

Fandy, Mammon. (May 12, 1994). “Yemen’s War, Democracy’s loss.” The Christian Science Monitor,
pg.18.

Fandy, Mammon. (July 28, 1994). “US Must Build on Success In Dealing with Yemen.” The Christian Science Monitor,
pg. 19.

FASonline. (January 1998). “Public Law 480 Sales Program: A Brief Explanation of Title I.” www.fas.usda.gov.

Fisk, Robert. (November 14, 1997). “Middle East: Arab Nations Stay Away from Talks in Snub to Clinton.” The Independent (London),
pg: 13.

Gause, F. Gregory. (1990). Saudi-Yemeni Relations: Domestic Structures and Foreign Influence. New York, Oxford, Columbia University Press.

Gerges, Fawaz A. (Winter 1997). “Islam and Muslims in The Mind of America: Influences on the making of U.S. Policy”. Journal of Palestine Studies, 26(2): 68-81.

Gleit, Heidi J. (March 30, 2000). “Israelis in Yemen have Foreign Passports.” The Jerusalem Post, pg. 4.

Gordon, Michael R. (March 15,2002) “Cheney Asks Yemen to Join the Pursuit of alQaeda’s Remnants.” The New York Times.

Higgins Andrew and Alan Cullison. (December 20, 2002). "The Story of a Traitor to alQaeda." The Wall Street Journal.

Holmes, Steven A. (November 27, 1993). “An American Diplomat is Abducted in Yemen”. The New York Times.

Hudson, Michael. (1997). “The Evolution of US Policy Toward Yemen: Seeking Stability in Arabia,” in E. G. H. Joffe ET. Al, Yemen Today: Crisis and Solutions. London: Carval Press.

Joffe, George. (1997) “Yemen and the Contemporary Middle East.” in E. G. H. Joffe ET. Al, Yemen Today: Crisis and Solutions. London: Carval Press.

Jones, Graham. (September 24, 2001). “Divisions Evident in Islamic Middle East, North Africa.”www.cnn.com.

Kalu, Kelechi A. (May 2001)

“Post- Cold War Realism, Liberal Internationalism, and the Third World”. Journal of Asian and African Studies,
36(2): P.225.

Killio, David. (July 30, 1994). “Saudi Meddlers In Yemen.” The New York Times.

Kostiner, Joseph. (1996). Yemen: The Tortuous Quest for Unity, 1990-94. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Legro, Jeffrey W and Moravcsik Andrew. (Fall, 1999). “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” International Security,

16(2): 5.

Leupp, Gary. (May 2002). “ The War on Terrorism in Yemen.” Counterpunch.

Leventhal Paul and Dolle Steven. (November 29, 1998). “Iraq's Inspector Games.” The
Washington Post.

Lichtblau, Eric and Glaberson, William. (March 5, 2003). "Threats and Responses: Financing Terror; Millions Raised for alQaeda in Brooklyn, U.S Says." The New York Times.

Los Angles Times. (November 20, 2002). "Yemen
Hunting Man Who Fled Before CIA Hit."

Lowrie, Arthur L.
(Sep 1995). “The Campaign Against Islam and American Foreign Policy”. Middle East Policy, 4(1-2): 210-220.

Miller, Judith. (October 26, 1990).
“Yemen’s Chief Assails Saudis On Gulf Crisis”. The New York Times.

Miller, Judith. (October 30, 1990). “Mideast Tensions; Yemenis Ousted by Saudis Bring New Burden Back to Their Land” The New York Times: pg1.

Mingst, Karen A. (1999). Essentials 0f International Relations.

New York, (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.

Morgenthau, Hans J. (1978). Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. Forth Edition, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978.

Newsweek. (March 26, 2001). “Desperate Hours: The Blast Claimed 17 Lives and Crippled a Destroyer,” pg 36.

Newsweek. (December 18, 2000). “Pieces of the Puzzle: A break in the case—but there’s not enough evidence yet to Link the Cole attack directly to Bin Laden,” pg. 48.International USS Cole bombing.

Nonneman, Gerd. (1997).“Key Issues in the Yemeni Economy.” in E. G. H. Joffe et. al,

Yemen Today: Crisis and Solutions. London: Caravel Press.

Prados, Alfred B. (November 20, 2000). “Yemen: Democratic Development and U.S. Relations”. CRS Report for Congress.

Prados, Alfred B. (September 13, 1999).“Yemen: U.S. Relations, Assistance, and the U.S.S. Cole Bombing.” CRS Report for Congress.

Radwan, Amany. (September 30, 2002). "An Unruly Backwater Tries Going Straight.” Time, pg. 8.

Republic of Yemen, Ministry of Legal Affairs. “The Yemeni Constitution of 1994.”

Rourke, John T., and Boyer. Mark A. (2000). World Politics: International Politics On The World Stage. USA: Dushkin/ McGraw-Hill.

Sachs, Susan. (February 6, 2002). “A Nation Challenged: The View From Iraq, Iran and Yemen,” The New York Times.

Schneider, Howard. (January 2, 2002). “For Yemen, a Risk and an Opportunity”. The Washington Post.

Sciolino, Elaine, (November 4, 2001).“U.S. Pondering Saudis’ Vulnerability” .The New York Times.

Selfa, Lance. (Spring, 1999). International Socialist Review.

Sharif, Abdu H. (March, 2002). “Weak Institutions and Democracy: The Case of the Yemen Parliament, 1993-97”. Middle East Policy,
1(1): 82-93.

The Economist Intelligence Unit. (2000-2001). Country Profile Yemen.

The Economist Intelligence Unit. (1996-97). Country Profile Yemen. 15 Regent Street, London SW1Y, 4LR, United Kingdom.

The Economist (US),
(Feb 16, 2002). “Could Yemen’s Calm Be Threatened? Yemen and its Islamists. (Yemen’s war on terror)”.

The Independent.
(London). (January 6, 1994). “Protests in Yemen.”

The
New York Times. (January 11, 1991). “Confrontation in The Gulf;

U.S. Reduces Yemen Staff.”

The New York Times. (July 5, 1994). “Yemen: Risky War, Cautious Response”.

The New York Times.
(November 23, 1990). “Mideast Tensions; Yemen Rebuffs Baker on Backing In U.N. for Assault on Iraqi Forces”. pg 18.

The Washington Post. (December 10, 2000). “Yemen’s President, Naming Names.”

Time. (July 16, 2001). “Missing Link: How Feuds And Culture Clashes Have Stymied The U.S.S. Cole Investigation”. 158(2): Pg 38.

UNSC (June 1, 1994) “UNSC Resolution 924 S/RES/924 (1994) on the Situation in Yemen.

UNSC (June 29, 1994) “UNSC Resolution 931 S/RES/931 (1994) on the Situation in Yemen.

US Congress, House of Representative Committee on Armed Services.
(May 2001). “The Investigation into the Attack on the U.S.S. Cole: Report of the House Armed Services Committee Staff.”

US Department of State. (2002).“Background Notes: Yemen.” Found at www.state.gov.us.

US Department of State. (2003).“Chiefs of Mission by Country, 1778-2001." www.state.gov.us

U.S Department of State. (1995). Background Notes: Yemen, “Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, November 1995”.

Watkins, Eric, (January 7, 1994). “Terror Main Weapon in Yemen War of Politics: The Arab Nation's Newfound Democracy and Unity are under Threat”. Financial Times (London).

Wenner, Manfred W. (1991). The Yemen Arab Republic.
USA: Westview Press, Central Avenue.

Wenner, Manfred W. (1967). Modern Yemen: 1918-1966. Johns Hopkins Press.

Whitaker, Brian (April 16, 1993). “Election Milestone,” Middle East International.

Whitaker, Brian (April 7, 1994). “Fragile Union At Mercy Of Outside Forces.” The Guardian (London).

Willems, Peter. (July- August 2002). “Yemenis Resist US Pressure”. The Middle East, pg.15-16.

Willems, Peter. (May 2002). “An Uphill Battle,” The Middle East,
Pg 17-19.

Yemen Embassy in D.C.

(September 11, 2001). “ A Letter of Condolences from Honorable President of the Republic of Yemen to the Honorable President of the United States of America.”

Yemen Embassy in D.C.
(September 11, 2001). “A Statement Concerning the terrorist attacks carried out in the United States.”

Yemen Embassy in D.C. (September 12, 2001). “ A Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Yemen to the Secretary of the United States of America.”

References in Arabic:

al-Hissamy, Khadija (2002). "The Yemeni-Saudi Relations" in Center for Future Studies, Yemen and the World. Cairo: Madpoli Library, 171-188.

al-Mouda’a, Hussein. (2002). “The Impact of Foreign Intervention on the 1994 Civil War in Yemen.” in Center for Future Studies, Yemen and the World. Cairo: Madpoli Library, 373-391.

al-Qarbi, Abobakr. (2002). “The United States and the Democracy Discourse on Yemen.” In Al-Saqaf, Fares, ed. The Yemeni-American Relations: Present and Future. Sana’a: Oabadi Center, 9-22.

al-Zindani, Manssor. “The United States and the Democracy Discourse on Yemen.” In Al-Saqaf, Fares, ed. The Yemeni-American Relations: Present and Future. Sana’a: Oabadi Center, 9-22.

J.K.C.S and Yemen Times, (October 31, 2001). “Seminar: Yemeni-American relations, the current challenges.” Sana’a.

Monasser, Hamoud (2002). “Yemen-American Relations 1990-2000” in Center for Future Studies, Yemen and the World. Cairo: Madpoli Library, 219-262.

Saed, Amen. (1959). Yemen in The World. Beirut: Dar alkitab alarabi.

¹ The events of September 1962 are described here as a revolution. However sources do disagree over the characterization of these events with the majority of Western scholars labeling it as a coup d’etat (see for examples.

²“Imam”, in the Islamic tradition, is a title given to the person who leads the people spiritually and temporally.

³ Taiz was the capital of Yemen during Imam Ahmed’s rule. After the revolution of September 1962, Snaa’a became the capital of the North Yemen.

⁴ When the revolution failed, Imam Ahmed decided to punish the leaders of the movement by ether death or long-term jail.

⁵ The British took control over South Yemen in 1839.

⁶ At this time Yemen and Saudi Arabia enjoyed very good and brotherly relations.

⁷ In 1950, a group of archeologists and oil explorers arrived in Yemen as part of this effort. (Wenner, 1967:178).

⁸ "Point Four," is a program that President Harry Truman announced in 1949 as an initiative to support developing countries. This program sought to improve the technical, economic and the social life in targeted countries, including Yemen. This program was part and parcel of the US effort to contain communism (Saed, 1959).

⁹The Suez Canal is an artificial waterway running North to South across the isthmus of Suez in Northeastern Egypt (1993-1999, Microsoft Corporation).

¹⁰ Aden was the main port in South Yemen, and under the British it became the second most important port in the World. Areas around Aden became known as the protectorates and unlike Aden, they were indirectly ruled by the British.

¹¹ This study refers to the events of 26 September 1962 in North Yemen as a "revolution" based on the terminology used among Yemeni officials and intellectuals. However, a rigorous analysis that applies the theory of revolutions may disagree with the terminology used here.

¹² “It was the 1952 July revolution in Egypt that guided the Freemen Movement towards a better substitute, which is the Republic” (Almadhagi, 1996).

¹³ The British were right in this regard. In 1963, just one year after the breakout of revolution in the North, another one broke out in the South and ended up with independence in 1967.

¹⁴ Zaydism is a branch of shaii Islam. Followers of this Shii sect resides in North Yemen. They are different from Sunni Islam in that they put more emphasis on Ali (the prophet Mohammad's cousin and son in law) as a legitimate successor to the prophet.

¹⁵ Shafi'iyyah is one of the schools in Islamic jurisprudence. Followers of this school see Qur'an and the Sunnah (acts of the prophet) as the major sources for legal authority.

¹⁶ It is interesting to see the US depart from this position today and act like many former colonial powers.

¹⁷ This aid was channeled through the USAID and its office in Sana'a.

¹⁸ These attempts were made first under President Ibrahim al-Hamdi (1974-1977) and later by President Saleh (1978- present).

¹⁹ Ali Nasser Mohammed took over in 1980.

²⁰ The Yemen labor tended to be concentrated in certain jobs such as constructions and services. When the countries of the Gulf passed that developmental stage and their economies required more skillful labor, the demand shifted from the Yemeni labor force to other countries.

²¹ This weapon would help president Saleh defeat the NDF in 1982 (al-Hissamy: 147).

²² It is ironic that Donald Rumsfeld (now Secretary of Defense an advocate of war against Iraq) shook hands with Saddam Hussein in 1984 when he was sent to Iraq by President Reagan.

²³ This figure appears higher than the estimates provided by the US Department of State. See (US Department of State, 2002

²⁴ Public Law 480 (PL480) allows the U.S. government to finance sales of “U.S. agricultural commodities to developing countries and private entities on concessional credit terms. Sales are made by private business firms on a bid basis in response to Invitations for Bids or "IFB's" issued in the United States by the participant. Sales are made at competitive U.S. market prices. The agreement's concessionality results from its extended credit periods and low rates of interest charged for the financing.” (FASonline 1998).

²⁵ Al-Attas was the Prime Minister of the ROY until the war broke out in April 1994.

²⁶ According to some estimates, the Saudis and the Kuwaitis spent $200 million to purchase weapons for the southern army (Whitaker April 7, 1994).

²⁷ Estimates of those killed and maimed vary from source to source. Data is compiled form a variety of sources including a report by the staff of the Committee on Armed Service of the US House of Representatives in May 2001.

²⁸ The activities of Jihad and Yemen’s involvement were part of organized CIA efforts (funded largely by Saudi government and charity groups within Saudi Arabia). Bin Laden, in particular, drew in his effort to mobilize people in the Muslim World for Jihad in Afghanistan on the wealth of his family.

• Comment will not appear until after review from administration.
• Please limit your comment to 500 words.
• Comments posted here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Site Owners.
• Please refrain from using profanity or vulgar language. Stay civil.